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THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR ON CRIME:
THE CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULT ON
JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
David M. Zlotnick*
"'The judges need to be intimidated'.. . [and] if they don't behave,
'we're going to go after them in a big way."'"
I. INTRODUCTION
N the last twenty-five years, the federal war on drugs has transformed
the landscape of the nation's criminal justice system. This country
now incarcerates its citizens at a higher rate than any other nation in
the world,2 and for the first time, the federal prison population now ex-
ceeds that of any individual state.3 The racial and gender impact of the
drug war has also been well publicized and equally decried.4 Less well
known is that another, concurrent battle has been raging, not between
* Visiting Professor, Washington College of Law, American University, Associate
Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law, J.D., Harvard Law School. For the
past year and a half, I have been a Senior Justice Fellow with the Open Society Institute.
As part of my research, I interviewed over fifty district judges about their sentencing phi-
losophy and views on the Guidelines and mandatory penalties. To ensure a frank discus-
sion, many interviewees requested anonymity. I also collected transcripts and other
documents from federal cases in which the judge felt the sentence required by the law was
too harsh but they imposed it nevertheless. I am indebted to a prisoner rights group, Fami-
lies Against Mandatory Minimums, for access to their files. The opinions expressed herein
are solely those of the author and not of the Open Society Institute. Many thanks to Peter
Margulies, Steven Chanenson, and Diana Hassel for their comments and to Kyle
Zambarano for his superb research and editing assistance.
1. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target 'Judicial Activism,' WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
1997, at Al, available at 1997 WL 12886568 (quoting House Majority Whip Tom Delay).
2. See, e.g., Molly Ivins, Will the Accountants Be Held Accountable?, BALT. SUN, Mar.
22, 2002, at 15A, available at 2002 WL 6953605. One of every thirty-two Americans (3.1%)
were in prison or jails or on probation or parole as of December 2002. See http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/preview/previewpr.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2004).
3. E.g., Kevin Johnson, Federal Prison Population Nears 165,000; Number Surpasses
States' Systems, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 2003, at A21, available at 2003 WL 5303980.
4. As noted in a recent study, if recent trends continue,
a black male in the United States would have about a 1 in 3 chance of going
to prison in his lifetime. For a Hispanic male, it's 1 in 6, for a white male, 1 in
17. The dramatic increase in the rate of African-Americans in prison is
largely the result of incarceration for drug offenses. The same is true for wo-
men who have been incarcerated nearly double the rate in 1980. One in
three women in prison are serving sentences for drug related crimes.
See CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/
0818/p02sol-usju.html.
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law enforcement and the drug culture, but between Congress and federal
judiciary-and the judiciary has been losing badly.
Since 1984, traditional notions of judicial sentencing discretion have
been virtually eliminated by legislation requiring mandatory minimum
penalties for drug and gun crimes as well as through the creation of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Although the central features of these changes
have been deplored by federal judges at every level and across the politi-
cal spectrum, 5 Congress continues to pass legislation that judges claim
transforms them into mere automatons, permitted only to apply a mathe-
matical formula that reduces offenders to a box on the Sentencing Guide-
line grid or a one-size-fits-all mandatory minimum.6 While some of the
grossest sentencing disparities of the pre-Guidelines era may have been
reduced,7 most commentators believe the larger consequences, particu-
larly of mandatory minimums, have been devastating.8 Low-level and
marginally culpable drug defendants with no information to trade have
received very harsh sentences based upon broad definitions of conspiracy
and weight-based penalty schemes. 9 More serious drug dealers, certainly
deserving of some punishment, regularly are meted sentences equivalent
or greater than state court sentences for rapists and robbers. 10 Nor have
disparity and discretion, the targets of these reforms, been eliminated.
Rather, these irremovable features of the criminal justice system have
simply been transferred to the police and prosecutors where they are
5. See, e.g., Anne Gearan, Supreme Court Justice Says 2 Million Behind Bars Too
Many, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., Apr. 10, 2003, available at 2003 WL 18613878 (reporting on
the critical remarks by fellow conservative Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy).
6. "Judges apply the rules mechanically... [which] is an uncomfortable form of judg-
ing, from which many have rebelled, particularly when the sentence required by the Guide-
lines conflicts with judge's own sentence of justice." Paul J. Hofer & Mark A. Allenbaugh,
The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 21 (2003).
7. "I believe that the Sentencing Guidelines promote a more deliberate, fair, and
rational sentencing process that exist at the state level, or in pre-Guideline federal sentenc-
ing." Hon. Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens; Have the Sentencing Guidelines Elimi-
nated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (1997); see
also William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 521 (1990) (arguing that a guideline
system can best balance uniformity with concerns of individual fairness).
8. See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003) (asserting the primary result of mandatory minimums has been
longer prison sentences); Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory
Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the
Criminal, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PUB. POL'Y 388, 424-25 (1996) (criticizing both
the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums for failing to adopt the principle of
proportionality).
9. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 6, at 71.
10. The average sentence for a federal drug felony in 2001 was seventy-four months,
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
fed.htm#Sentencing (last visited Jan. 23, 2004), while the average sentence for a state vio-
lent crime felony in 2000 was only sixty-six months, Department of Justice, Criminal Sen-
tencing Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2004).
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largely hidden and unreviewable."
This article discusses the most recent restrictions on federal judicial dis-
cretion, the 2003 Feeney Amendment, passed as part of the Amber Alert
bill, which together became the PROTECT Act of 2003.12 The Feeney
Amendment provisions have the potential to gut downward departures, 13
one of the few remaining tools in the judges' arsenal, while other provi-
sions, such as the "depart and tell" reporting requirements seek to intimi-
date the federal judiciary into conformity.1 4 As background, Part II
covers three subjects-it briefly discusses my background and perspective
on the battle over judicial versus prosecutorial discretion, it explains the
recent history of federal sentencing law and the shift towards mandatory
sentencing, and finally it chronicles the reaction of the federal judiciary to
these developments. Part III explains the genesis and provisions of the
2003 Feeney Amendment. Part IV broadens the inquiry to a discussion
of the root causes of Congress's war on judicial discretion. Part V gathers
evidence that conditions are ripening for a reevaluation of sentencing
policy but recognizes that neither a critical mass has been reached, nor
has tide towards restrictions on discretion yet been stemmed. The Con-
clusion suggests how the federal bench can contribute to restoring bal-
ance in federal sentencing without overstepping the proper limitations on
judicial participation in political discourse.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING DISCRETION
A. THE AUTHOR'S PERSPECTIVE
This article begins with two premises shared by most academics and
federal judges. First, that in the past twenty-five years, federal sentences,
especially for drug offenses, have become too harsh. Second, that too
much of the power to determine sentences has been shifted from judges
to law enforcement officers and federal prosecutors. Therefore, although
this Part cites numerous sources for these two points, this Article focuses
on the "why questions" at the root of judicial and academic dissatisfac-
tion: Why have the statutory sentences for the drug and gun crimes,
which dominate the federal docket, come to defy the law of gravity? Ad-
ditionally, why has Congress continually cut back on judicial sentencing
discretion? In the interests of full disclosure, however, I first briefly lay
out my experiences, first as a federal prosecutor and now as an academic
11. For an interesting discussion of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion in state juve-
nile criminal cases, see Cassandra S. Shaffer, Comment, Inequality Within the United States
Sentencing Guidelines: The Use of Sentences Given to Juveniles by Adult Criminal Court as
Predicate Offenses for the Career Offender Provision, 8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163,
181 (2002).
12. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650.
13. See, e.g., Siobhan Roth, Bench Bristles at New Sentencing Law: Measure Seeks to
Curb Downward Departures, CONN. L. TRIB., May 12, 2003, at 12 (arguing that the bill
"interferes with judicial independence [and] wrongly suggests that judges aren't doing their
jobs properly").
14. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 93.
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and public interest advocate, 15 that have influenced my opinions on these
issues.
During the heart of the crack epidemic,16 I served as an Assistant
United States Attorney in the District of Columbia.17 My colleagues and
I were the primary dispensers of justice in the nation's capital. Because
the vast majority of criminal cases were brought in D.C. Superior Court,
most new federal prosecutors spent several years there before moving up
to U.S. District Court. At this stage, we were more like big city district
attorneys than federal prosecutors in other jurisdictions; we had heavy
case loads and only a few supervisors. Thus, we had a large say in who to
prosecute and what plea offers to make, and if defendants rolled the dice
with a jury, we usually won.18 Thus, the real issue was usually the proper
sentence. 19
At sentencing, however, our role was only advisory. This made sense.
While we were well-intentioned civil servants, we were also generally
young and always human. Some prosecutors were also more partisan in
orientation. Occasionally, when a crime particularly offended us, or less
commendably, defense counsel made our lives difficult, our plea offer or
sentencing recommendation might be harsher than the courthouse aver-
age. Frequently, in those instances, it was the experience and objectivity
of the presiding judge that ensured that some rough equivalent of equal
justice was done. This is not to say that there were not outlier judges
whose bias was well known and whose sentences provoked outrage in our
office (or conversely at the public defender). But few believed that the
solution was to transfer sentencing discretion to the prosecution and po-
lice by instituting rigid mandatory sentencing provisions. 20 Rather, most
15. In 1995-96, I took a leave from teaching to be the first Litigation Director for
Families Against Mandatory Minimums ("FAMM"), and I remain a member of their Liti-
gation Advisory Board.
16. See, e.g., Beverly Xaviera Watkins & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, The Crack Epi-
demic and the Failure of the Epidemic Response, 10 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 371,
371-73 (2001) ("Commentators on the decade of the 1980s named 'crack' as an unparal-
leled destructive force, undermining safety, stability, and health in inner city
communities.").
17. The D.C. United States Attorney's Office is unique because it prosecutes criminal
offenses under both the U.S. Code in U.S. District Court and the D.C. Code in D.C. Supe-
rior Court.
18. We won because we had the resources of various police departments at our dispo-
sal and because an overwhelming percentage of defendants were guilty of the charges
against them. But see Teresa Roberts, Wrongful Conviction Reason Enough to Care About
DNA, S. BEND TRIB., Dec. 8, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103678826 (though it is difficult to
estimate exactly how many innocents are wrongfully convicted, over 112 prisoners have
been exonerated through DNA evidence in the United States).
19. While there was a significant motions practice, the "counter revolution" in crimi-
nal procedure under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts meant we rarely lost a suppression
hearing.
20. There were some mandatory minimums under the D.C. Code for drug crimes but
those could be and generally were avoided in one of two ways. First, by allowing the vast
majority of defendants to plead to an "attempt" crime which did not carry a mandatory
minimum. Even after a trial, if the judge found at sentencing that the defendant commit-
ted the crime because of drug addiction, probation and treatment were allowed in lieu of
the mandatory sentence.
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recognized that a system where prosecutors chose the charges and plea
offers, defense counsel attempted to keep the system honest, and judges
sentenced was the best and most balanced attempt to achieve justice. 2'
The impact of tampering with this longstanding division of sentencing
labor became immediately apparent to me when I was transferred to the
federal narcotics section in U.S. District Court. In my first federal drug
trial, a multi-defendant search warrant case, the presiding judge, a re-
vered, one-armed WWII veteran, did everything he could to sabotage my
case. He even granted one defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal
despite uncontradicted testimony that moments after the police broke
down the door, a large amount of crack cocaine had been thrown from
the window of the room in which this defendant had been the sole occu-
pant.22 After the other defendants were convicted and sentenced to
terms of fifteen years or more, the judge called me up to the bench where
he had a few kind words for me and then delivered an anguished lecture
about the harshness of the mandatory drug laws. Even while still a prose-
cutor, I soon came to agree with him. Mandatory minimums, and at
times, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, have disabled federal judges
from doing the difficult job of determining the punishment that best fits
each particular crime, and even more importantly, each unique offender.
B. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
MANDATORY MINIMUMS
This section traces the transformation of federal sentencing policy with
a focus on: (a) the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which govern all fed-
eral criminal cases, and (b) the mandatory minimum drug and gun cases
that dominate the federal criminal docket.
In early American history, criminal penalties followed the English
model with specific terms for each crime. 23 The nineteenth and twentieth
centuries saw this system quickly give way in both federal and state courts
to reliance on the combination of statutory ranges, judicial discretion, and
21. A system of presumptive guidelines, or even mandatory guidelines, with some
form of appellate review, is fully consistent with this division of labor and in fact is the
preference of many judges I interviewed, including those who were former prosecutors.
Presumptive guidelines and some appellate review function to reduce egregious disparities
without creating the kinds of injustice that flow from rigid systems that aggregate power in
one party's hands.
22. Unlike efforts by sentencing judges to reduce the impact of a conviction, which
have endured harsh criticism from Congress and prompted the Feeney Amendment, mid-
trial dismissals of minor drug cases rarely receive press and therefore have flown below the
radar of Congress and press. This judge, already on senior status, soon thereafter refused
to take any more drug cases.
23. Though initially most criminal sentences resulted in the death of the defendant,
eventually "prison sentences became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law rec-
ognized that these, too, must be proportional." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983);
see Renee C. Harrison, Note, Do the Crime, Do the Time, but the Punishment Should Fit
the Crime: Does Mississippi Need Sentencing Guidelines, 21 Miss. C. L. REV. 121, 124




the advent of regularized parole.2 4 Under this power sharing scheme,
legislatures defined crimes and prescribed a range of years, judges gener-
ally had unfettered discretion to impose any term up to the statutory
maximum (or even probation), and the executive, through the parole
board, had the power to release the inmate before the expiration of that
term based upon a prisoner's rehabilitative efforts. 25 While customs
within jurisdictions tended to guide the decisions of sentencing judges
and parole boards, a broad bipartisan consensus began to form in the
1960s and 1970s that there was too much disparity in federal sentencing.2 6
In fact, it was liberals, such as Judge Marvin Frankel, who initially pushed
for sentencing reform, arguing that racial minorities and the socio-eco-
nomically disadvantaged received harsher sentences than other
defendants.
27
Numerous bills failed until the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 ("SRA"), which created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion ("Sentencing Commission") and mandated the creation of a
mandatory guideline system.28 The SRA also abolished parole, requiring
prisoners to serve at least 85% of the sentence. 29 Three tortuous years
24. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposefid Departures: Fixing a Juris-
prudence that Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21,
25 (2000) (describing sentencing during this period as "vast and virtually unlimited
discretion").
25. For a few years during the 1950s, Congress did pass the first mandatory drug
sentences, but they were viewed as a failure and repealed. Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety
Valve Failure, Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1471, 1484-85 (2000).
26. Recent studies now dispute the extent of the pre-Guidelines disparity problem or
whether the Guidelines have had an appreciable impact. See Michael A. Simons, Depart-
ing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity, and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L.
REV. 921, 926 n.24 (2002) (comparing alternate opinions on inter-judge variation in sen-
tencing prior to the institution of the guidelines); Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 8 (2002) (claiming the problems of disparity endure under the
modern guidelines). The problem with any pre- and post-Guideline comparison is the
Guidelines push disparity into the investigation and charging phase where it is difficult to
detect and measure.
27. KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 35-37 (1998). Ironically, the Sentencing Guidelines and
mandatory minimums have increased the percentage of African-Americans and women in
prison and increased their sentences at a higher rate than whites as well.
28. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentences Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 992 (1984)).
29. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(1) (2002). By statute,
reduction for good time is limited to 15% of the total sentence. Id. ch. 1, pt. A(6). After
release, instead of parole, released prisoners serve a statutory term of "supervised release."
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2000). Violation of supervised release can result in a return to prison
to serve an additional period over and above the original term. Id. § 3583(e)(3). Many of
the states have also abolished parole and implemented sentencing guidelines. However,
most state guidelines are voluntary or employ presumptive ranges. Some states have ex-
perimented with mandatory minimums as well, but with a few exceptions, the federal drug
laws generally result in longer sentences. One well known exception are New York's
"Rockefeller" drug laws. Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It Time to Change the Rockefeller Drug
Laws?, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 613, 613-14 (1999). Michigan also had very
severe mandatory penalties but repealed them last year. Gary Heinlein, Michigan Eases
Drug Sentences, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 29, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 102339705.
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later, the Sentencing Commission released the first version of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines, applicable to all crimes after that date. 30
The Guidelines are based upon a two axis grid. The vertical axis is the
offense level.31 Based upon existing sentencing data, every offense in the
U.S. Code was given a base offense level 32 that correlated to a specific
punishment range.33 The Sentencing Commission then identified addi-
tional factors that would raise or lower the base offense level such as role
in the offense or amount of financial harm.34 The horizontal axis is the
criminal history level.35 Points are assigned for prior convictions depend-
ing on seriousness, remoteness, or other factors such as whether commit-
ted while on parole or probation. 36 Based on the total criminal history
points, a defendant is placed in one of six criminal history categories.
37
Using the adjusted offense level and criminal history category, the sen-
tencing judge finds the sentencing range on the grid.3 8 By congressional
mandate, each grid box prescribes a range with a high end generally not
more than twenty-five percent higher than the low. 39 For example, a de-
fendant with a criminal history category of I and an offense level of
twenty-six is subject to a sentence that falls between sixty-three and sev-
enty-eight months. 40
The Sentencing Commission did make provisions for exceptions called
"departures." Judges could go above or below the guidelines range if the
judge found that the case fell outside "the heartland" of circumstances
and factors considered by the Sentencing Commission. 41 Some departure
grounds were suggested in the Sentencing Guidelines and others, such as
age, socio-economic background, gender, and substance addiction were
forbidden. 42 Judges also retained discretion to depart if they considered a
combination of factors unique to a particular case.43 All departures, how-
30. The labyrinthian debates and tribulations of the first Commission have been well
documented. See, e.g., Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1701-03 (1992)
(discussing the "parsimonious" basic principle of the guidelines and labeling the early
guidelines as "a long process of trial and error").
31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
32. For example, second degree murder has a base offense level of 33. Id. § 2A1.1.
33. The punishment for second degree murder ranges from 135 months to 293 months.
Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
34. Id. § 1B1.1(b)-(c).
35. Id. ch. 1, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
36. Id. § 4A1.1.
37. Id. ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.
38. See id.
39. "If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the
maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that
range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum
term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment." 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(b)(2) (2000).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.





ever, and in fact all calculations, were made subject to judicial review.44
The other significant change was the Sentencing Commission's decision
to move a modified "real offense" sentencing regime. Under this system,
a sentencing judge is required to look at the real offense conduct and all
related "relevant conduct" rather than just the offense of conviction to
determine the Guideline range.45 Thus, a defendant who is convicted by
a jury of just one count of possession with intent to distribute or conspir-
acy to distribute narcotics based upon a single sale or seizure can never-
theless be sentenced up to the statutory maximum based upon all related
"relevant conduct" that was known or reasonably foreseeable to the de-
fendant. 46 Thus, a defendant who goes to trial on a single act for a rela-
tively small amount can nevertheless face a very high guideline sentence
because the statutory maximum for most drug crimes start at twenty
years and quickly escalate to forty.47 Worse yet for defendants, the gov-
ernment's burden of proof at sentencing is only a preponderance rather
than beyond a reasonable doubt.48
C. MANDATORY MINIMUMS FOR NARCOTICS AND THE GUIDELINES
In 1986, before the first Sentencing Commission finished its work, col-
lege basketball star and Boston Celtic draft pick Len Bias died from a
cocaine overdose. 49 This event spiked a growing national hysteria over
crack cocaine and Congress fell into an anti-drug frenzy.50 The result
was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.51 Passed without any hearings,
44. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)-(b) (2000). Before the SRA, sentencing decisions, in the ab-
sence of illegality, were virtually unreviewable. A sentence within the applicable range and
decision not to depart, however, remain discretionary and unreviewable decisions (so long
as a court makes clear that its decision is discretionary rather than a perceived absence of
grounds for a departure). See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1990).
45. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3. The compromise of a modified
real offense system reflected a deeper flaw according to some commentators-the failure
of Congress and then the first Commission to articulate a uniform philosophy to be fol-
lowed. Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 6, at 21. Instead, the SRA directs the Commis-
sion to consider all the traditional, and sometimes conflicting justifications for punishment:
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. See id. at 54-68. Today, how-
ever, most commentators believe that the current Guidelines reflect primarily a retributive,
just desserts approach. See, e.g., id. at 54 (labeling the philosophy the "modified just desert
[sic]" approach).
46. See Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 6, at 54.
47. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B).
48. United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633 (1997) (holding that even conduct for which
the defendant was acquitted can be used for sentencing enhancements when it can be
proved by the preponderance of the evidence).
49. See, e.g., Phil Taylor, 86ed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 8, 1996, at 64 (reporting that
Len Bias died within 48 hours of being drafted by the Boston Celtics). While the media
reported that Len Bias died of a crack cocaine overdose, later investigations suggest that
he and his friends were using powder cocaine. Nevertheless, the initial reports largely
fused the image of Len Bias, a black athlete, with the abuse of crack cocaine. Lisa Wiehl,
"Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping, 18 HARV.
BLACK LETER L.J. 185, 206-07 (2000).
50. See, e.g., William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine
Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1249 (1996) (describing Bias' death a significant
motivation for the change in drug laws).
51. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000); see also Spade, supra note 50, at 1233.
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with no input from the judiciary, and very little input from even law en-
forcement agencies,52 this bill instituted weight-based mandatory mini-
mums for a wide range of illegal narcotics with penalties far harsher than
existing federal law.53 For example, five grams of crack cocaine, the
weight of two packets of sugar, now drew five years in prison,54 with
doubling and then life penalties for recidivists.5 5 These new mandatory
minimum drug laws were problematic for the Sentencing Commission,
which had been using past sentencing data to set penalties. 56 Ultimately,
the Sentencing Commission decided that the mandatory minimums, like
five years for five grams of crack, would be used to set the floor, or base
offense level, for most drug offenses under the guidelines.57 Further-
more, each drug guideline range could then be increased based upon
other sentencing factors such as leadership role or possession of a
weapon. 58 With this decision, the Sentencing Commission guaranteed
that most Guidelines drug sentences would be even higher than the new
mandatory minimums. 59
The mandatory minimum for drugs also "trumped" the Guidelines. If
the Guidelines called for a sentence of seventy to eighty-seven months
but the statutory mandatory minimum called for ten years (120 months),
the Guideline sentence has to be adjusted to 120 months.60 Also, unlike
the a Guidelines sentence, judges cannot decide on their own to depart
below a mandatory minimum.61 The only exception initially provided by
Congress was if the defendant cooperated in the investigation and prose-
52. See, e.g., Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics
and Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 408 (1996) (claiming "the careful, deliberate procedures
of Congress were set aside in order to expedite passage of the bill").
53. Id. at 409 (identifying the primary factor in the determination of quantity thresh-
olds as an "individual member's perceptions of what quantity of drugs constituted an im-
portant drug case in their jurisdiction").
54. The 1986 Act required distribution or possession with intent to distribute to draw
the five years. In 1988, Congress made simple possession of five grams of crack a five year
mandatory offense. No other drug carries a federal mandatory minimum for simple pos-
session. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2000).
55. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A).
56. The U.S. Sentencing Commission had determined sentencing lengths based "upon
an analysis of 10,000 actual cases" before the mandatory minimums altered those findings.
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 18 (1988). The mandatory minimums "severely con-
strained the Commission's approach" because they conflicted with "the finer-grained cali-
brations of the Guidelines." Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 6, at 34.
57. See Jesseca R.F. Grassley, Comment, Federal Sentencing Policy Following the Co-
caine 1995 Report: Issues of Fairness and Just Punishment, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 347, 392
(1998).
58. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(b)(1), 3B1.1(a).
59. There are also factors that can reduce the Guideline range, such as acceptance of
responsibility and minor or minimal role adjustments. See id. §§ 3B1.2(a), 3E1.1.
60. Id. § 5G1.1. This situation actually occurs more frequently now as the Sentencing
Commission moved in a few instances to decouple the baseline offense from the
mandatory minimum leaving Guideline ranges for some LSD cases frequently below the
statutory minimums. Id. app. C, amend. 488.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 536 U.S. 545, 570 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(arguing "statutory mandatory minimums generally deny the judge the legal power to de-
part downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that call for leniency").
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cution of another offender. 62 This key, however, was given to the prose-
cutor, not the judge.63 Without a "substantial assistance" motion by the
U.S. Attorney's Office, judges were powerless to sentence below the
mandatory minimum even if the judge felt the defendant had made a
good faith effort to cooperate. 64 Unfortunately, low-level offenders, like
couriers or the girlfriends and wives of dealers, often had no one to "rat
out" 6 5 or they waited too long to come forward out of ignorance, loyalty,
or fear. In these cases, judges have been forced to impose mandatory
minimum terms on these defendants, while higher-ups in the same drug
network cooperated in exchange for lesser sentences. 66
D. JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE GUIDELINES AND DRUG
MANDATORY MINIMUMS
Disentangling the judicial reaction to the Guidelines as opposed to the
mandatory minimums requires some care. Because both the Guidelines
and drug mandatory minimum penalties became effective within a two-
year period, many judges referred to them interchangeably (although
their specific complaints can actually be assigned to one or the other).
Regardless, judicial reaction to both was overwhelmingly negative.67 At
first, the loudest shouting seemed to be about the Guidelines. In the past,
judges broadly pondered what combination of rehabilitation, "just des-
serts," deterrence, and incapacitation best fit the case and their own phil-
osophical preferences, and then picked a number.68 Now, judges were
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(e); 2002 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1I.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(e); 2002 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1.
64. See United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 183-84 (1992) (agreeing with the district
court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines mandate that a court retained "no
power to go beneath the minimum" without a "substantial assistance" motion from the
prosecution).
65. See Maria Limbert, Problems Associated With Prosecutorial Control Over Filing
Substantial Assistance Motions and a Proposal for a Substantial Assistance Pre-Sentence
Hearing, 27 J. LEGIS. 251, 258 (2001).
66. In a May 2002 report to Congress, the U.S. Sentencing Commission delineated
three primary findings regarding offender characteristic trends in federal drug sentencing:
(1) "The majority of federal cocaine offenders generally perform lower level functions";
(2) "[t]he concentration of offenders at lower levels has increased since 1995"; and (3)
"[tjhe dominance of lower level offenders is particularly pronounced among crack cocaine
offenders, two-thirds of whom were street-level dealers in 2000." United States Sentencing
Commission, Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, May 2002, ch. 4,
at 36, available at http://www.ussc.gov/rcongress/02crack/Ch4.pdf (last visited July 7,
2003); see also Froyd, supra note 25, at 1471-72 (claiming "the combination of mandatory
minimums for low-level offenders and the substantial assistance downward departure for
high-level offenders has led to disparity in sentencing between offenders with varying
levels of culpability); Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 588-90 (1998) (comparing the
percentage of substantial departures in the districts of Connecticut and Massachusetts).
67. See, e.g., Tracey Thompson, Applying a Formula to Justice; Sentencing Rules Limit
Judges' Discretion, WASH. POST, June 12, 1989, at Al, available at 1989 WL 2050174 (re-
porting sentencing reform "drew immediate opposition from judges, who saw it as an intru-
sion by the executive branch into the judicial domain").
68. See supra note 45 (discussing the Commission's failure to announce a sentencing
philosophy).
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severely restricted in the sentences they could impose, and for the first
time, they had to justify their sentencing decisions to the appellate
courts.69 The Guidelines also require complex calculations 70 and fre-
quent post-trial hearings.71 In addition, Guidelines litigation created an
entirely new body of appellate case law that district judges had to learn
along with yearly Sentencing Commission amendments, which now total
over six hundred and have resulted in an appendix longer than the origi-
nal Guidelines. 72 Judges rebelled against this combination of more work,
less authority, and appellate oversight, and many held that the Sentencing
Guidelines were a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 73 The
Supreme Court disagreed, however, in Mistretta v. United States.74
Separately, a significant number of judges were also distressed by the
consequences of the mandatory minimums created by the 1986 Act.
Mandatory minimums create arbitrary sentencing cliffs; one tenth of one
gram could put the defendant into a higher statutory mandatory mini-
mum.75 This seemed irrational to judges who were used to making
nuanced sentencing decisions.
A "drug warrior" mentality during the Reagan and Bush I years also
led federal prosecutors to bring many more drug cases in federal court to
take advantage of the new penalties.76 As a result, drug cases as a per-
centage of the federal docket rose as did the overall caseload of the fed-
eral courts.77 In a few districts, the U.S. Attorney decided to prosecute
virtually every qualifying case in federal court, ignoring considerations of
federalism and judicial resources that in the past directed small or local
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New "Slid-
ing Scale of Deference" Approach to Abuse of Discretion: Appellate Review of District
Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. CRIm L. REV. 1, 3
(1997).
70. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
71. Kim Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical
Evaluation, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 757, 763 (1993) (claiming the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines have greatly complicated the sentencing process and consumed more judicial
resources).
72. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2002).
73. See, e.g., Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1257 (9th Cir. 1988), over-
ruled by Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Prior to Mistretta, "200 judges
declared the guidelines unconstitutional." Gertner, supra note 26, at 6.
74. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding the sentencing guidelines did not violate non-delega-
tion principle of the separation of powers doctrine).
75. See Froyd, supra note 25, at 1490-91 (claiming the "cliff effect" rejects "graduated,
proportional increases in sentence severity for additional misconduct or prior conviction").
76. See, e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus & Arthur S. Hayes, State Courts in '89 Got 100
Million New Cases as Tort Suits Rose 7.6%, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at B4, available at
1991 WL-WSJ 609342 (reporting drug related prosecutions were "overwhelming the fed-
eral court system"); Sara Sun Beale, Get Drug Cases Out of the Federal Courts, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 8, 1990, at A16, available at 1990 WL-WSJ 589385 (reporting drug prosecutions in
the federal courts have risen by 229% and are accelerating).
77. See Beale, supra note 76 (reporting drug cases constitute approximately 40% of
the federal docket and "account for 44% of criminal trials and roughly 50% of criminal
appeals"). Symptomatic of this problem, in the year of 1989, the federal prison population
experienced its largest annual growth in sixty-five years. Lutjen, supra note 8, at 418 n.156.
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drug cases to state courts.78 The resulting slew of petty, small time deal-
ers being charged in federal court particularly outraged some judges who
felt federal court should be reserved for weighty matters of national con-
cern.79 Other judges voiced concerns about the increase in "dry conspira-
cies" where no drugs were ever seized by the police and the conviction
and sentence depended entirely on the dubious testimony of cooperating
witnesses, even when many of these had been higher up in the chain than
the defendant on trial.80 The most agonizing cases for the judges, how-
ever, were the ones that resulted in lengthy sentences for minor players in
drug conspiracies, especially for low-level offenders like couriers or the
girlfriends and wives of dealers. 81 In transcript after transcript, judges
essentially apologized to defendants and their families and blamed Con-
gress for tying their hands.82
The federal bench attempted to make its voice heard through formal
policy making channels. 83 The Federal Judicial Center wrote a report
highly critical of mandatory minimums in 1994,84 and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and other Supreme Court Justices and circuit judges have routinely
criticized these laws as well. 85 The best and most politically neutral argu-
78. Jay Stephens, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia from 1988
to 1993, required his prosecutors to bring virtually every drug case that met the minimum
weight requirement for a mandatory minimum to be charged in federal court.
79. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Congress is Crippling Federal Courts, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 1992, at 3B, available at 1992 WL 3514530 (claiming the 33% rise
in criminal appeals in the first year of the sentencing guidelines is symptomatic of an
overburdened federal court system).
80. In 1998, a Tenth Circuit panel held the testimony of a co-conspirator must be sup-
pressed when the witness obtained a benefit, usually a promise of leniency, in exchange for
that testimony. United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated by 165
F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see, e.g., David W. Gleicher, 'Singleton' Goes Down
for the Count, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 20, 1999, at 5 (comparing a promise of leniency in
exchange for testimony against a co-defendant, to a promise to "get your mother a job so
she can pay her mortgage").
81. For example, Federal District Court Judge Stanley Marshall publicly stated "I've
always been considered a fairly harsh sentencer, but it is killing me that I am sending so
many low-level offenders away for all this time." Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Jus-
tice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439,
458 n.84 (1999) (two of the three authors of this article are themselves judges).
82. See infra notes 320-21.
83. A minority of judges have been willing to speak with media on this issue. See John
Marzulli & Bill Hutchinson, Killer Gets Life, With Regrets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 18,
2002, available at 2002 WL 102193371 (labeling U.S. District Court Judge Jack Weinstein
an "outspoken judge... [who] has been a longtime critic of the federal sentencing guide-
lines" after he apologized to a convicted murderer for giving him a life sentence, the first
such sentence given by the judge during his thirty-five years on the bench); Robert Moran,
War on Drugs Is a Lost Battle, Judges Say, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 2002, available at 2002
WL 14968432 (reporting on a panel discussion at Temple University where two U.S. Dis-
trict Court judges, Judge John T. Curtin of New York and Judge John Kane of Colorado,
openly criticized the federal sentencing guidelines).
84. BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FINDINGS
(1994).
85. Michael Brennan, A Case for Discretion; Are Mandatory Minimums Destroying
Our Sense of Justice and Compassion, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1995, at 18, available at 1995
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ment has been that mandatory minimums are unnecessary because the
Guidelines and the appellate review provisions of the SRA are sufficient
to police unwarranted judicial disparity.86 This position has been en-
dorsed, not only by the bench but by virtually all commentators. 87 Unfor-
tunately, these voices of reason have been discounted and ignored by
Congress. Through the 1990s, Congress, seemingly addicted itself,
adopted new mandatory minimums, and increased the punishment for ex-
isting ones in response to publicity about drugs such as ecstasy and
methamphetamine. While this period saw a few statutory and Guideline
changes that minimally reduced sentences for the lowest-level non-vio-
lent offenders,8 8 major efforts by the Sentencing Commission and the ju-
diciary to address the most egregious penalty provisions such as the
disparity between sentences relating to crack and powder cocaine 89 and
to roll back prosecutorial control over substantial assistance departures,
were either rejected outright or otherwise garnered no Congressional
audience.90
WL 14647063 (reporting Rehnquist's claim that mandatory minimums were "a good exam-
ple of the law of unintended consequences").
86. The argument posits "the guidelines are superior to mandatory minimums because
... [the] Commission not only has developed relatively narrow ranges within which a judge
is to sentence an offender, but it has also provided a limited opportunity for departure."
Lutjen, supra note 8, at 441. Moreover, the vast prosecutorial discretion which accompa-
nies mandatories actually frustrate the Guidelines' efforts to ensure uniformity. Id. at 441-
42.
87. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Drug Policy Research Ctr., RAND,
Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences: Throwing Away the Key or the Taxpayers' Money?,
available at http:l/www.rand.org.publications/MRIMR827/ (last visited July 14, 2003). For a
list of individuals and organizations that oppose mandatory minimums, see the Families
Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) website, at http://www.famm.orgl
si against-mandatory.htm (last visited July 14, 2003).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (enacting "safety valve" legislation); 2002 U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c), amend. 488 (amending the manner in which LSD is
weighed for sentencing purposes); id. § 2D1.1(c), amend. 516 (amending the manner in
which marijuana plants are counted).
89. Crack cocaine is punished 100 times more severely than powder cocaine although
cocaine is imported to this country in powder form. Five grams of crack carries a five year
mandatory. It takes 500 grams of powder for the same sentence. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). Moreover, it takes little more than baking soda, water, and a micro-
wave to convert powder to crack. See Spade, supra note 50, at 1273-74 (documenting a
case where the supplier of powder cocaine received a punishment far less than the two
defendants who cooked that powder and created crack cocaine). Although there was ini-
tially thought to be a difference in addiction and its effect on pregnant women, recent
studies show little difference. See United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 54 (1995) available at http://
www.ussc.gov/crack/chapl-4.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). Nevertheless, Congress rejected
a 1995 Commission amendment to equalize punishment for these two forms of cocaine.
90. Interestingly, despite increases in statutory penalties, federal drug sentences have
actually decreased slightly over the past ten years. Frank Bowman and Michael Heise
assert this has been a joint project of local federal judges and prosecutors who have en-
deavored to bring some rationality and fairness case-by-case. Frank 0. Bowman, III &
Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug
Sentences, 86 IowA L. REV. 1043 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion?];
Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of




Nevertheless, prior to the Feeney Amendment in 2003, judicial opposi-
tion to the Guidelines appeared to be more muted in recent years. A
variety of reasons have been offered. The addition of the "safety-valve"
in 1996 provided a mechanism for sentencing below the mandatory mini-
mums for the lowest-level non-violent offenders. 91 Judges have also dis-
covered ways to work with counsel to alleviate harsh sentences in some
cases, 92 and as appellate case law developed to guide them, judges felt
less out on a limb when departing downward. During the Clinton presi-
dency, Attorney General Janet Reno also rolled back the strict charging
and plea policies of the previous administrations,93 thus allowing greater
flexibility for prosecutors. In addition, as the judicial confirmation pro-
cess in the second Clinton presidency became more contentious, his nom-
inees tended to hew more to the center and many had prosecutorial
backgrounds. These judges tended to be less offended by long sentences
and structured decision-making required by the Guidelines. Finally, the
majority of sitting federal judges have experienced only the Guidelines
and hence there was no golden era to which they harkened back.94 Still,
Congress was not finished dismantling judicial discretion. For the past
two years, it has focused on the one remaining contentious area-down-
ward departures.
91. See supra note 83. The safety valve, however, "does not successfully exempt all
low-level drug offenders from severe sentences." Froyd, supra note 25, at 1472.
92. Fact and charge bargaining, whereby the parties and the judge allow the defendant
to plead and be sentenced for lesser conduct, were the primary mechanism, followed by
cooperation agreements for very little cooperation and departures that stretched the mean-
ing of the chosen grounds. "'The Guidelines .. . have made charlatans and dissemblers of
us all. We spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting and
ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. All under the banner of truth in
sentencing!"' STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 90 (quoting an anonymous federal
judge).
93. In the Bush I administration, the Justice Department's stated policy was for fed-
eral prosecutors to "charge the most serious, readily provable offense." Memorandum
from Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, to United States Federal Prosecutors, enti-
tled Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act (March 13, 1989) (commonly
known as "the Thornburgh Memo"), reprinted in THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YEL-
LEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 622 app. 12 (1989 supp.). Janet Reno
softened this policy, authorizing that plea agreements should be based on "an individual-
ized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances of
the cases." Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno, to United States Attorney's
and Litigating Divisions, entitled Principles of Federal Prosecution (Oct. 12, 1993) (on file
with author) (more commonly known as the Reno Blue Sheet). Note that the Bush II
Justice Department has now returned to the Thornburgh principles as part of its response
to the Feeney Amendment. See infra, notes 174-99 and accompanying text.
94. As of July 2003, 748 federal judges have been commissioned since the end of 1987.
History of the Federal Judiciary, Website for the Federal Judiciary, Washington D.C., avail-
able at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/hisj (last visited July 18, 2003) (search for
federal judges commissioned after January 1, 1988).
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III. DEPARTURES AND THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
A. DEPARTURE RATES AND THE JUDGE ROSENBAUM DEBACLE
It is critical to remember that there are two basic types of departures.
First, departures based upon cooperation allow a judge to go below a
mandatory minimum but require a government motion.95 About fifty
percent of all departures are for such substantial assistance. Downward
departures under the Guidelines are at a judge's discretion but are
trumped by any applicable mandatory minimum.96 Since 1984, the over-
all downward departure rate has slowly crept upwards, though the rate
and type of departure have varied by jurisdiction. 97
At least in some circuits, judicial departures were given a boost by the
Supreme Court in Koon v. United States, which held that departures
should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion and that judges were not
limited to departures specified by the Sentencing Commission.9" How-
ever, at least half of the increase in downward departure rates can be
attributed to prosecutor-sanctioned departures initiated to ease court
congestion,99 especially in the border states where illegal immigration and
95. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
96. The only exception is the so-called "safety-valve" provision. See supra note 60 and
accompanying text.
97. For example, see United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Statis-
tics by State, District and Circuit, Table 9 for the years 1998-2001, which indicates that the
national rate of federal departures, other than substantial assistance departures, has risen
steadily each of the last four fiscal years, from 13.6% in 1998 to 18.3% in 2001. See http://
www.ussc.gov/LINKTOJP.HTM (last visited July 16, 2003). The Sentencing Commission's
recent report to Congress contains the best data and analysis of departure rates. See
United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress: Downward Departures From
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 10 (October 2003) [hereinafter Downward Departure
Report].
98. 518 U.S. 81, 99 (1996). Prior to Koon, in "some circuits, the trial courts' discretion
was limited to merely proposing bright-line rules to the circuit court which, if adopted,
became standards for future operation-the equivalent of judicial amendments to the
Guidelines." Carlos M. Pelayo, Give Me A Break! I Couldn't Help Myself: Rejecting Voli-
tional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section
5K2.13, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 738 (1999). As noted by Marc Miller and Ronald White,
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Koon sets out a framework for analyzing departure factors:
If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot use it as
a basis for departure. If the special factor is an encouraged factor, the court
is authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it
into account. If the special factor is a discouraged factor, or an encouraged
factor already taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the court
should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some
other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is
present. If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court must, after
considering the "structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines
and the Guidelines taken as a whole," decide whether it is sufficient to take
the case out of the Guideline's heartland.
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. White, Your Cheatin' Heart(land): The Long Search for Ad-
ministrative Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723, 780-81 (1999) (citing United
States v. Koon, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996)).
99. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 299, 346-47 (2000) (discussing the
Southern District of California's "fast track" departure plan for illegal immigrants).
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drug cases have overwhelmed the court system. 0 0 In other jurisdictions,
commentators suggest that sympathetic prosecutors have been making
cooperation agreements based upon minimal cooperation to alleviate
what would be otherwise harsh mandatory sentences for low-level offend-
ers.10 1 Admittedly, there are some judges who grant more than the na-
tional average of downward departures based upon their view that the
otherwise proscribed Guideline sentences are too harsh. Moreover, these
judges assert the sentences are overly severe either for non-mandatory
minimum offenses like white collar crimes or for drug dealers for whom
they believe the required mandatory minimum is more than sufficient.
Curiously, only a small percentage of downward departures have been
appealed by the local U.S. Attorney's Offices.'0 2 Some suggest this is
because local prosecutors are in silent agreement with many of these de-
partures. 10 3 Others believe that, prior to Ashcroft's Justice Department,
sentencing appeals were historically low because local offices devoted the
majority of their resources to investigations and active cases rather than
to appeals. In addition, the Solicitor General's Office was stingy in ap-
proving sentencing appeals. To the extent these reasons account for the
increasing downward departure rate, these explanations reflect the crimi-
nal justice system's attempts to maintain flexibility and fairness much
more so than just a judicial effort to evade congressional dictates to in-
crease drug sentences. 10 4
Nevertheless, during the last two years, John Ashcroft's Justice Depart-
ment and conservatives on the Hill began to articulate the sentiment that
the growing departure rate was primarily the result of pockets of "liberal"
judges who were soft on crime.10 5 They argued that these judges were
undermining the Guidelines and mandatory minimum drug penalties and
100. Id.
101. For example, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during 2001, substantial assis-
tance motions were made in 40.3% of drug cases, whereas the rate for the entire Ninth
Circuit is 10.7% and the national average is 17.1%. United States Sentencing Commission,
Federal Sentencing Statistics by State, District and Circuit 2001, Table 8, 11-13, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2001/pa0l.pdf (last visited July 19, 2003).
102. "Of the more than 230,000 sentences handed down from 1999 through 2002, prose-
cutors appealed only 282 of them." Jess Bravin & Gary Fields, House Panel to Probe U.S.
Judge, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2003, at A2, available at 2003 WL-WSJ 3961643. The defend-
ants also appealed 138 of those 282. Id.
103. Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Soft
Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003 ("[S]o few departures are appealed because
'most assistant U.S. attorneys recognize they're appropriate,' though they may argue other-
wise." (statement of Judge John Martin)).
104. See Bowman & Heise, Quiet Rebellion?, supra note 90.
105. See Laurie Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Soft
Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003 (noting that the House Judiciary Committee
has tangled with several judges who have imposed sentences below mandatory minimums);
John R. Steer, Sentencing Commission Review, Cong. Testimony, Oct. 13, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 23833583 (testifying before the Congressional Sub-Committee on Judicial
Oversight on the increase in departure rates in the post-Koon era and ultimately finding
"some reason for concern, particularly if the trends continue unabated, while also seeing a
guideline sentencing scheme that remains fundamentally sound").
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that legislation was needed to reign them in °106 Adding fuel to this fire
was the Judge Rosenbaum debacle, which may have been the tipping
event that led to the introduction and passage of the Feeney Amendment.
In May 2002, Chief Judge James M. Rosenbaum of the Minnesota Dis-
trict Court voluntarily appeared before the House Committee on the Ju-
diciary to testify against a bill that sought to rollback a recent Guideline
amendment that capped offense levels for drug defendants judged to
have a "minimal role" in the overall distribution network. 107 Judge Ro-
senbaum was the former U.S. Attorney for Minnesota and a Reagan ap-
pointee. 10 8 He began his testimony by explaining that he was "no
bleeding heart." 10 9 Nevertheless, he supported the amendment and op-
posed the bill arguing that capping drug guidelines for minimal partici-
pants properly shifted the focus of sentencing back to the culpability of
the perpetrator and away from the scope of the conspiracy. 110 He argued
this was fairer because these individuals rarely made much money and
they exerted no real control over the operation."' Using initials rather
than names, he provided about a dozen short profiles of defendants in
Minnesota who he felt illustrated the need for sentencing relief for low-
level offenders.112 Judge Rosenbaum's status and conservative creden-
tials helped defeat the bill, but the reaction of the conservatives on the
House Judiciary Committee was swift.
Under the guidance of Chairman Sensenbrenner, the Committee on
the Judiciary demanded that Judge Rosenbaum turn over documentation
to support his case examples. 113 When he balked, they threatened him
106. See sources cited supra note 105.
107. Tony Mauro, Judiciary Committee to Debate Disparity in Drug Sentences, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 2002, at 4. Before this amendment, if the scope of the conspiracy
of which was foreseeable to a minimal participant such as a drug courier, he was subject to
liability for the entire quantity of drugs in the network. Id. Commission amendments take
effect unless Congress affirmatively rejects them. H.R. 4689 was introduced to reject the
Commission's proposal. H.R. Rep. No. 107- 4689 (2002).
108. Greg Gordon, Judge Sits in the Middle of Capitol Struggle; Congress and the Fed-
eral Bench are at Odds over James Rosenbaum's Drug Sentences, STAR TRIB., Mar. 15,
2003, at 1B, available at 2003 WL 5530871.
109. Hon. James M. Rosenbaum, Testimony Before the United States House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary 3 (May 14. 2002) (transcript on file with author).
110. Id. Rosenbaum compared low-level drug offenders to "minnows," and contended
the sentencing guidelines should impose the harsh penalties on the "sharks" or the "major
players" in the drug trade. Id. at 3; see also Gordon, supra note 108, at 1B; Peter Margu-
lies, Battered Bargaining: Domestic Violence and the Plea Negotiation in the Criminal Jus-
tice System, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 153 (2001).
111. "The present sentencing system sentences minor and minimal participants who do
a day's work, in an admittedly evil enterprise, the same way it sentences the planner and
enterprise-operator who set the evil plan in motion and who figures to take its profits."
Rosenbaum, supra note 109, at 3; see also Mauro, supra note 107, at 4 (quoting Hon. James
M. Rosenbaum).
112. Susan Schmidt, Judge Accused of Misleading House Panel: Republicans on Sub-
Committee Say Testimony on Drug Sentencing Was Inaccurate, WASH POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at
A2, available at 2002 WL 102569652.
113. Jason Hoppin, Drug Sentencing Probe Worries Bench, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 24, 2003, at 4.
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with a congressional subpoena. 114 Through counsel, the judge provided
some records while the Committee staff traced the rest on their own.115
Based on their research, the Committee then wrote a scathing report that
accused Judge Rosenbaum of a litany of misconduct including the follow-
ing: (1) claiming that he had suggested that defendants were being con-
victed based upon legally insufficient evidence; (2) providing false and
inaccurate information about these case profiles; (3) generally being hos-
tile to the Guidelines; and (4) perhaps unlawfully closing a sentencing
hearing. 116 Specifically bothersome to the Committee was that in a num-
ber of his examples, Judge Rosenbaum (or another Minnesota judge),
had actually departed below the presumptive Guideline sentence that
Judge Rosenbaum referenced in his testimony about these cases.117 As a
result, the Committee felt that on this point his testimony was false and
misleading.1 18
These unmentioned departures were nevertheless legitimate and defen-
sible. Either the government itself had moved for a substantial assistance
departure, or the sentencing judge had discovered another legitimate
ground-such as the "safety-valve"-on which to base the departure. 119
But the Committee report claimed that at least two, and perhaps three, of
Judge Rosenbaum's departures had been illegal under the Guidelines.1 20
In the next session, a larger "fix" for controlling "independent judges"
like Judge Rosenbaum was then proposed-the Feeney Amendment. As
discussed below, some believe that the controversy surrounding Judge
Rosenbaum's departures was a key factor in the drafting and ultimate
passage of this legislation.
114. The subpoena would have forced Rosenbaum to produce "records from his cases
since Jan. 1, 1999, identifying drug-related cases in which he departed from sentencing
guidelines ... [and] sentencing transcripts, the status of appeals, copies of all decisions and
the names of any court personnel who helped in his testimony before Congress." Rob
Hotakainen & Pam Louwagie, State's Chief U.S. Judge Might Face Subpoena; House Panel
Investigating Sentencings in Drug Case, STAR TRIB., Mar. 13, 2003, at 1A, available at 2003
WL 5530675. There was substantial opposition to issuing the subpoena from both inside
and outside the Congress. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 108, at 1B (reporting Rep. Jim
Ramstad's belief that this judge "would not run a stop sign"); Hotakainen & Louwagie,
supra, at 1A (reporting University of Minnesota law Professor Barry Feld considered the
subpoena an act of "intimidation"); Bravin & Fields, supra note 102, at A2 (reporting Rep.
Bobby Scott's belief that the subpoena was a "bizarre overreaction").
115. Fairness in Sentencing Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4689 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 9-10 (2002).
116. Id. at 9 (2002). The Committee also asked the Eighth Circuit to discipline the
judge, and it refused to do so. Gordon, supra note 108, at lB.
117. Fairness in Sentencing Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4689 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 29-30 (2002).
118. Id. at 13-20.
119. Id. at 14, 16.
120. Id. at 29-30.
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B. THE 2003 FEENEY AMENDMENT
In late March 2003, prodded by Chairman Sensenbrenner and the De-
partment of Justice, a freshman representative from Florida, Tom Feeney,
introduced a sentencing reform bill as an amendment to the popular Am-
ber Alert legislation. 12 1 An admitted "bomb thrower" in the Florida leg-
islature, Feeney was once labeled by the governor as "the David Duke of
Florida politics." 122 Some commentators such as ABA President Alfred
Carlton, Jr. saw a direct link between the Feeney Amendment and the
Judge Rosenbaum controversy. 123 "I think it was a result of the powers-
that-be recognizing that the subpoena route wasn't going to be very fruit-
ful . . . . Better to go ahead and just legislate-and that's what they
did.",124
The bill was attached as a rider just before the House voted on the
Amber Alert Bill. Thus, it reached the House floor absent a hearing
before the House Judiciary Committee and without formal input from the
Sentencing Commission. To this end, it passed after minimal floor de-
bate, in a manner reminiscent of the 1986 drug penalty changes. 125 As
one commentator put it: "While America was focused on the opening
weeks of the war in Iraq, the US. Justice Department had another target
in its sights-a sneak attack on the independence of the 665 federal dis-
trict judges to determine fair and responsible sentences for people con-
victed of federal crimes. 1 26 Moreover, the decision to attach these
mostly unrelated sentencing provisions to a bill on child sex crimes made
it difficult for members to vote against the bill. 127
121. See, e.g., Jason Hoppin, Bill Would Curb Judicial Discretion, LEGAL INTELLI-
GENCER, Apr. 9, 2003, at 4. The formal name of the bill that passed is the "Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003" or the
"PROTECT Act." Mike Martindale, Amber Alert Will Now Protect All Children, DE-
TROIT NEWS, May 1, 2003, at 2, available at 2003 WL 17888237. Feeney claimed that fed-
eral judges were giving sex offenders no more than a "slap on the wrist" and with
"increasing frequency." Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary,
CHAMPION, June 2003, at 8. Representative Feeney later stated that he "was simply theImessenger' of the amendment bearing his name, which was drafted by two Justice Depart-
ment officials, Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel Collins and Jay Apperson,
counsel to the House Judiciary Committee [and former Assistant U.S. Attorney in Vir-
ginia]." Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign Against Judge's
Soft Sentences, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003.
122. Tamara Lytle, Feeney Makes an Impression as Freshman on Capitol Hill, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 28, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WL 18420211 (reporting on the personal
notoriety garnered by Feeney in response to his sponsorship of the sentencing
amendment).
123. Rob Hotakainen, Sentencing Leeway-or Leniency?, STAR TRIB., May 8, 2003, at
16A, available at 2003 WL 5535030.
124. Id.
125. Allenbaugh, supra note 121; see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
126. James K. Jenkins, Give Federal Judges Sentencing Discretion Back, ATLANTA J.
CoNsT., June 9, 2003, at A9 available at 2003 WL 56079739.
127. For example, the senior Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy, "expressed 'deep concern"' about the Feeney Amendment, but ultimately voted
for the Amber Alert Bill. Dan Christensen, Stealth Bomber, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV.,
Apr. 15, 2003, at 1.
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In the form passed by the House of Representatives, 128 the Feeney
Amendment would have dramatically limited judicial departures by inter
alia: a) eliminating departures grounds such as aberrant behavior, family
ties, and military service (which are a popular grounds judges have used
to lower sentences where the otherwise required punishment seems dis-
proportionate), 129 and b) prohibiting downward departures to only those
few factors specifically identified by the Sentencing Commission.130 Spe-
cifically, the last provision in particular would have gutted the very heart
of the departure concept. That is, allowing judges to depart in unusual
circumstances was a recognition by the original Sentencing Commission
that it could not anticipate every circumstance that might warrant adjust-
ments to the ordinary results of the offense and criminal history guide-
lines.13 ' The first version of the Feeney Amendment eliminated this
residual judicial discretion and made departures no different than any
Guideline amendment (which is subject to congressional oversight). In
other words, by eliminating all non-Guideline specified departures, Con-
gress would ensure that there would be no departures on any grounds
other than those written by the Sentencing Commission and reviewed by
Congress.
In the two week period before the conference committee meetings, a
concerted lobbying effort limited these two changes to just sex crimes,
but the bill that passed still contained additional provisions that affect all
sentencing in important ways.132 The key immediate changes included:
(a) requiring de novo appellate review of all departures (overruling Koon
v. United States);133 (b) prohibiting downward departures based on new
grounds on remand; 34 (c) requiring a government motion to grant the
128. This bill was passed by the House on March 27, 2003. Ralph Grunewald,
NACDL's Fight to Save Judicial Discretion, CHAMPION, June 2003, at 7.
129. See, Allenbaugh, supra note 121, at 8.
130. See id. at 9.
131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.A4(b) (2002).
132. Letters of opposition were sent by the Chief Justice, the Secretary of the Judicial
Conference, the Sentencing Commission, the ABA, the Cato Institute, the Washington
Legal Foundation, and over 70 law professors. Grunewald, supra note 128. The New York
Times, Washington Post, and other papers also wrote editorials opposing the bill. See, e.g.,
John S. Martin Jr., Editorial, Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31;
Editorial, House Without Mercy, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2003, at A20, available at 2003 WL
17425634. Academics also contributed. See Steven L. Chanenson, The Return of Hammu-
rabi, 26 PENN. L. WKLY. 14 (2003), WL 4/7/2003 PLW 12.
133. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 670 (2003).
134. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401,117 Stat. 650, 671 (2003). It reads, con-
cerning an imposition of a sentence upon remand:
(2) The court shall not impose a sentence outside the applicable guidelines
range except upon a ground that-
(A) was specifically and affirmatively included in the written statement
of reasons required by section 3553(c) in connection with the previ-
ous sentencing of the defendant prior to the appeal; and
(B) was held by the court of appeals, in remanding the case, to be a
permissible ground of departure.
Id. One of the unintended consequences of this provision may likely be increasingly long
sentencing hearings, even where the judge grants a requested departure. To protect addi-
tional grounds, should the appellate courts overturn the departure granted, "defense coun-
[Vol. 57
THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR ON CRIME
extra one level reduction for extraordinary acceptance of responsibil-
ity;135 and (d) reducing the number of federal judges on the Sentencing
Commission from at least three of the seven to no more than three. 136
Each of these changes is significant for its own reasons; but the overrul-
ing of Koon may prove to be the most important in reducing judicial sen-
tencing discretion. I say may, because the Sentencing Commission's post-
Feeney report asserts that the effect of Koon on increasing departure
rates was actually unclear. Its data suggests that "although the rate of
increase in the departure rate generally is higher post-Koon than pre-
Koon, the rate of increase actually began to accelerate in 1994, almost
two years prior to Koon, and has been relatively consistent thereafter.' 37
Nevertheless, the switch from an abuse of discretion standard to de novo
review is likely to reduce downward departures for at least three reasons.
First, the increasingly conservative appointees on the Courts of Appeals
are less likely to agree with district court judges in close cases (with the
experience of the Fourth Circuit as the best existing example).1 38 Second,
those judges who were pushing the envelope with aggressive departures
before Feeney may now be deterred, knowing it will be easier for the
government to obtain reversals on appeal. 139 Third, although the govern-
ment rarely appealed downward departures before the Feeney Amend-
ment,140 the more favorable standard of review may encourage
appeals.' 41
Consequently, the Feeney Amendment's micro-management of the sex
offense guidelines will clearly only affect a narrow slice of cases. Never-
theless, these changes are symbolically important because they illustrate
sel must now find a way to insist politely but firmly that the initial sentencing court rule on
every alternative basis for departure and that it include those accepted bases in the written
statement of reasons for the departure in the judgment and commitment order." Lisa A.
Cahill & Kevin F. Clines, Outside Counsel: Waiver Dangers Under the PROTECT Act,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 5-6.
135. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 671 (2003).
136. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 676 (2003).
137. Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 54. However, the pre-Koon in-
crease could easily be explained by an increase in the number of lower courts implement-
ing the deferential stance approved in Koon in advance of the decision. Moreover, despite
Koon, conservative circuits, such as the Fourth Circuit, continued their restrictive approach
to departures after the decision in Koon, thereby limiting the expected post-Koon
increase.
138. See supra note 137.
139. In both scenarios, at least in circuits that took Koon at its word, careful judges had
been able to protect their departures by relying on factual findings to insulate their deci-
sions. See, e.g., United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1036 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming
downward departure based upon the district court's finding of extraordinary family cir-
cumstances); see also Ian Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion:
Koon's Failure to Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79
B.U. L. REv. 493, 530-49 (1999) (providing a circuit-by-circuit analysis of downward depar-
ture jurisprudence post-Koon).
140. See Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 54-55.
141. In addition, the new appeals policy instituted by the Department in response to
directives in Feeney, is designed to increase appeals of departures and arguably, to deter
certain classes of departures by putting judges on notice that such departures will receive
close scrutiny at Main Justice. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
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just how Congress has abandoned its original conception of the Sentenc-
ing Commission. 142 Originally, the Sentencing Commission was supposed
to be an expert body of judges and academics who would make sentenc-
ing policy and eliminate disparity away from the heat of politics. While
the Sentencing Commission's influence had fallen considerably since its
inception for a variety of reasons, 143 the Feeney Amendment was the first
time that Congress actually wrote Guidelines language itself, bypassing
the Sentencing Commission entirely.1 44 The gutting of judicial represen-
tation on the Sentencing Commission was also largely a symbolic act that
demonstrated Congress's distrust of the judicial branch. Now, although
officially housed in the judicial branch, the Sentencing Commission is
statutorily prevented from ever having its judicial members constituting a
voting majority. Nevertheless, given the Sentencing Commission's al-
ready weak political position and cautiousness in recent years, it is not
clear the new non-judicial majority will result in significant policy
changes. 145
The "depart and tell" provision, on the other hand, had both symbolic
import as well as the potential for influencing sentencing decisions. This
provision requires that detailed information about every criminal case, by
judge (and including any departure grounds), be sent to the Sentencing
Commission and made available to the Department of Justice for
study.146 Thus, Congress will have access to the necessary information to
142. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-69 (2003). This
precedent bodes poorly for the future of the Commission's independence as a policy mak-
ing body.
143. Key events in this regard include the override of the Commission's crack amend-
ment, see Jon M. Sands, Crime and Politics: Big Government's Erratic Campaign for Law
and Order, 49 FED. LAW. 52 (2002) (book review), at WL 49-JUL FEDLAW 52, and the
failure of President Clinton to nominate new Commissioners when their terms expired, see
Dep't of Justice, Quick Clinton Appointments Key to 1993 Changes, DOJ Alert, Feb.
1993, at WL 3 No. 2 DOJALT 2, as well as other examples of Congress ignoring the Com-
mission's advice, see Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentenc-
ing: The Opportunity and Judicial Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
93, 100-02 (1999); The Sentencing Commission and Its Critics, 2 FED. SENTENCING REP.
205-52 (1990); Miller & Wright, supra note 98, at 729-35; see also Testimony of Julie Stew-
art before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 18, 1997), reprinted in 9 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 317, 318 (1997) (lamenting the fact that the Commission has "let Congress kick you
around"); Deanell Reece Tacha, Serving this Time: Examining the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines After a Decade of Experience, 62 Mo. L. REV. 471, 479 (1997) (criticizing the
Commission for "primarily responding to the specific, ad hoc concerns of Congress" in-
stead of being "more proactive in setting its own agenda").
144. Other bills directed the Commission to implement policy goals but stayed away
from mandating offense levels and writing specific language for the Commission to
incorporate.
145. On the other hand, one perhaps could argue that the Court should revisit Mistretta
and the separation of powers issue, as Congress has not even maintained the pretense that
the Commission is a judicial entity.
146. The PROTECT Act reads:
(h) IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION.-Section 994(w) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
(w)(1) The Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure that, within 30
days following entry of judgment in every criminal case, the sen-
tencing court submits to the Commission a written report of the
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perform the kind of case-by-case analysis to which Judge Rosenbaum's
examples were subjected. In evaluating the import of this provision, one
cannot really argue that Congress should be forbidden from collecting
this information. Judicial sentences are public information. Thus there is
no reason that policymakers, the press, and academics should not have
access to this data, even in a judge-by-judge format.147
However, in the current climate of congressional hostility, federal
judges are rightly alarmed that this provision is not a harmless data col-
lection device or a failsafe mechanism. Rather it exists as a tool for intim-
idation. It is this latter concern that has been heard most frequently
before and after passage. For example, Senator Kennedy argued that this
provision would result in a "judicial blacklist."'1 48 Similarly, in a speech to
the Federal Judges Association, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed both
the Judge Rosenbaum controversy and the new Feeney reporting require-
ments. 149 He recognized that while Congress has a right to data upon
which to base legislation, inquiries that "target the judicial decisions of
individual federal judges, could amount to an unwarranted and ill-consid-
ered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their
judicial duties.' 150
District Court judges were more direct in their comments.151 Judge
sentence, the offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, sex of
the offender, and information regarding factors made relevant by
the guidelines. The report shall also include-
(A) the judgment and commitment order;
(B) the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which
shall include the reason for any departure from the other-
wise applicable guideline range);
(C) any plea agreement;
(D) the indictment or other charging document;
(E) the presentence report; and
(F) any other information as the Commission finds appropriate.
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 672 (2003).
147. Moreover, providing Main Justice with this data might occasionally be necessary to
thwart a renegade judge who continually departed, but who is considered too powerful for
local federal prosecutors to challenge on their own. But see Order Declaring Title IV of
the Section 401(h)(1)(2) & (3) Report of the Attorney General of the Protect Act and
Feeney Amendment Unconstitutional, United States v. Robert Mendoza, Case No. 03-730,
at 12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004); PROTECT Act's Reporting Requirements Usurp Judicial
Power, District Court Says, 74 CRIM. L. REP. 293 (Feb. 4, 2004).
148. See Influential Judges' Group Urges Repeal of Tough Sentencing Guidelines, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, available at 2003 WL 2436701.
149. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the Federal
Judges Association Board of Directors Meeting (May 5, 2003) available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-05-05-03.html (last visited July 28, 2003).
Interestingly, Attorney General Ashcroft's letter to federal prosecutors quotes from this
speech at length to support the notion of congressional supremacy over sentencing, but
without noting the Chief Justice's concerns about the potential threat to judicial
independence.
150. Id. at 7. In opposing the original bill, Chief Justice Rehnquist added that, "this
legislation, if enacted, would do serious harm to the basic structure of the sentencing guide-
line system and would seriously impair the ability of the federal court to impose fair and
responsible sentences." Allenbaugh, supra note 121, at 10.
151. In January 2004, the chief judges of the Ninth Circuit condemned the Feeney
Amendment at their annual meeting. In addition to the substantive provisions of the bill,
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Gerald Bruce Lee of the Eastern District of Virginia stated that "the Fee-
ney Amendment is an overreaction to a nonexistent problem and an un-
warranted restriction on sound judicial decision-making." 15 2  Judge
Martin, long an outspoken critic of congressional sentencing policy, fi-
nally had enough and announced his resignation from the bench and in-
tention to return to private practice. 153
In the post-Feeney period, several district court judges have gone so far
as to state on record that the Feeney Amendment's reporting provision
deterred them from departing in cases they felt were otherwise appropri-
ate for a lower sentence. 154 For example, Minnesota's Judge Paul
Magnuson decided not to depart in a white collar case that led to a four
year sentence. He stated: "This reporting system accomplishes its goal:
the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to depart."'1 55 In an-
other case from Montana, Judge Donald Molloy felt he could not depart
in the case of a Chinese immigrant who was convicted of harboring illegal
aliens. The defendant himself had been homeless upon his arrival in this
country many years ago and the judge believed he had acted as a good
Samaritan and nothing more. This judge stated at sentencing:
I believe that this case is one that the Feeney amendment, in seeking
to strip federal judges of their judgment, will lead to more unjust
sentences and that what we will end up with is a third branch of
administrators heeding the beck and call of those who have a sense
these judges objected to failure to consult with the judiciary or heed the Sentencing Com-
mission's views before passing the bill. Paul Chavez, Western Judges Rip New Law Limit-
ing Sentencing Discretion, at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0127districtjudges-
ON.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
152. Allenbaugh, supra note 121, at 10; see also Adam Liptak, Opposition Rises to
Crime Bill's Curb on Judicial Power in Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at A10 ("I'm
a Republican, but I don't think this is good legislation .... I don't know of any federaljudge who thinks it's a good idea." (statement of United States District Judge John F.
Kennan)); Thanassis Cambanis, Sentencing Law Targets US Judges in Massachusetts, Bos-
TON GLOBE, May 30, 2003, at Al ("It turns me into a bureaucrat, and I do not believe for a
moment that the public wants that .... " (statement of Judge Nancy Gertner)).
153. See Martin, supra note 132; Edward A. Adams, Federal Judges Scores Mandatory
Sentences for Dealing in Drugs, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 26, 1993, at 1. On February 2, 2004, Judge
Robert Cindrich (W.D. - Pa.) stepped down from the bench to take a job in the private
sector. He said that the sentencing policies of Attorney General Ashcroft were "'morally
wrong' and have disproportionately affected minorities and poor people." He also added
that the current system has transformed federal judges into "little more than functionaries"
and that the system perversely punishes low level criminals with no information harshly
while "big time pushers and violent criminals can get reduced sentences if they give infor-
mation to prosecutors." Associated Press, Federal Judge Rips Sentencing Guidelines as He
Steps Down, Feb. 2, 2004, at WL 2/2/04 APWIRES 07:23:34.
154. Judge Jack Weinstein, (S.D.N.Y.) announced his plans to tape all sentencing hear-
ings. He stated that since the Feeney Amendment essentially allows the Courts of Appeal
to re-sentence, those judges should see and hear the defendant for themselves. Judge
Weinstein "is among several federal judges who have openly accused Congress of trying to
bully them into imposing harsher sentences." Tom Hays, Associated Press, Jan. 29, 2004, at
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/crime/nyc-sexOl3O,0,2231592.story?coll=nyc-
manheadlines-crime (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).
155. Steve Karnowski, Federal Judge Claims Sentencing Pressure, AP WIRE, Oct. 22,
2003, at WL 10/22/03 APWIRES 08:40:28.
[Vol. 57
THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR ON CRIME
of justice reflected in the old testament. 156
In January 2004, district Judge Dickran Tevrizian did not just complain
about the Feeney Amendment, he ruled that the reporting requirements
were unconstitutional. He wrote that the statute's requirement for re-
ports on individual judges who grant downward departures from the Sen-
tencing Guidelines "chills and stifles judicial independence to the extent
that it is constitutionally prohibited.' '157 The judge's memorandum order
notes that while the law does not on its face give the Executive or Legis-
lative branch and power over the Judiciary, the "threat, real or apparent,
is blatantly present. '158 He found no legitimate purpose was served by
reporting individual judicial performance to Congress and there held that
the Feeney Amendment was "a power grab by branch of the government
over another branch, which is prohibited by Congress" 159-in technical
terms-that it violated the separation of powers principle. A district
court judge in Hawaii, however, came to opposite conclusion in an order
issued the very next day, 160 hence this issue will have to be resolved by
the Ninth Circuit and perhaps the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the
statements and rulings of Judge Tevrizian and other judges161 about the
156. Sent. Tr. at 26, United States v. Chang Gou You, Cr. 02-15-H-DWM (D. Mon.
Sept. 11, 2003). Other judges have continued to depart but fear reversal under Feeney. See
Mark Hamlett, Judge Takes Aim at Congress in Sentencing U.N. Shooter, N.Y. LI., Oct. 22,
2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jspid=1066605411059 (last visited Dec. 20,
2003) (discussing Judge Robert Patterson's (S.D.N.Y) decision to depart downward in case
where a man harmlessly shot a gun at the United Nations as a political statement). The
judge called the Feeney Amendment Congress's "latest attack on the third branch of gov-
ernment" and claimed that "Congress sought to deter any departures by the implicit threat
to trial judges that, if they are considered for appellate positions, they will be subjected to
the type of demeaning and unseemly treatment which nominees to the courts of appeals
have undergone at the hands of Congress in recent years." Id. As this article goes to the
press, it does appear that there has been an increase in government appeals and reversals.
See also Mike Schneider, Federal Appeals Panel Applies Anti-Crime Amendment Retroac-
tively, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/breaking-news/7818615.
htm (reporting that the Eleventh Circuit had reversed a sentence of Judge Gregory
Presnell (M.D. Fl.), applying the provisions of the Feeney Amendment retroactively). But
see Pamela Manson, Judge Asserts His Right to Stray from Guidelines, SALT LAKE CITY
TRIB., July 28, 2003 (reporting on an opinion and decision to depart by recent Bush ap-
pointee Judge Paul Cassell (D. Utah) that the judge released to dispel the "'hyperbolic
claims' that judges have no authority in any case to reduce sentences").
157. Order Declaring Title IV of the Section 401(h)(1)(2) & (3) Report of the Attorney
General of the Protect Act and Feeney Amendment Unconstitutional, United States v.
Robert Mendoza, Case No. 03-730, at 12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 13. The court denied challenges to other sections of the Act and found the
reporting provision severable, thus the defendant was entitled to no specific relief in his
case from this victory and stayed the order pending appeal. Id. at 14.
160. See Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Impose Sentence Without Reference to
the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Thomas M. Schnepper, Cr. N. 02-62 (D. Ha.
Jan. 13, 2004) (Judge Alan C. Kay) (rejecting various challenges to Feeney Amendment
including separation of powers attack on the reporting provisions).
161. Another Southern District Judge, Sterling Johnson, decided to place a blanket seal
on all documents required by the Feeney Amendment that would forbid Congress from
reviewing these materials without his approval. Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges
Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at B1, available at http://
www.november.org/dissentingopinions/NYJudges.html (also quoting anti-Feeney Amend-
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reporting requirement and other sections of the Feeney Amendment
have rekindled judicial opposition to limits on their sentencing discretion
in a way not seen since the Guidelines and mandatory minimums were
first passed.
The Feeney Amendment also contained prospective provisions and di-
rectives to the Sentencing Commission and the Department of Justice. It
forbade the Sentencing Commission from adding any new departure
grounds for two years, instructed the Sentencing Commission to amend
the guidelines and policy statements to substantially reduce the incidence
of downward departures, and lastly, directed the Department of Justice to
assist in this endeavor.1 62 As discussed in the next section, the implemen-
tation of these directives by the Department of Justice and the Sentencing
Commission, may in the long run, have the most significant impact on
sentencing discretion.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
1. Implementation by the Department of Justice
The Feeney Amendment's directives to the Department of Justice re-
sulted in several policy changes during the summer and fall of 2003 that
"may significantly impact departure practices," according to a recent Sen-
tencing Commission report. 163 Most pertinently, Feeney directed that the
Department of Justice adopt policies and procedures to: a) ensure that
the Department of Justice Attorneys oppose sentencing adjustments, in-
cluding downward departures, that are not supported by the facts and the
law; and b) delineate objective criteria, specified by the Attorney Gen-
eral, as to which cases may warrant consideration of an appeal, either
because of the nature or magnitude of the sentencing error, its prevalence
in the district, or its prevalence with respect to a particular judge.164
The Department of Justice responded quickly to the Feeney directives,
first with a July 28, 2003 memorandum to all federal prosecutors, which
implemented a new departure reporting and appeal process and amended
the United States Attorneys Manual (the "Ashcroft Appeals Memo"). 165
ment remarks by Judges Thomas C. Platt, Robert P. Patterson, Jr., and Guido Calabresi,
and Roger J. Miner).
162. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21 § 401, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); see infra note
164 and accompanying text.
163. Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 10.
164. PROTECT Act, § 401(1). Additional directives required the DOJ to ensure that
the Department of Justice attorneys in such cases make a sufficient record so as to permit
the possibility of an appeal; ensure that the Department of Justice attorneys promptly no-
tify the designated Department of Justice component in Washington concerning such ad-
verse sentencing decisions; and ensure vigorous pursuit of appropriate and meritorious
appeals of such adverse decisions. Id.
165. The DOJ acted quickly in order to avoid more onerous reporting provision in the
bill that would take effect if the Department did not institute policies within ninety days.
That provision would have required the Attorney General, within fifteen days after a dis-
trict court's grant of a nonsubstantial assistance departure in any case, to submit a report to
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees identifying the case, the facts involved, the
identity of the district court judge, the district court's stated reasons, whether the district
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The Ashcroft Appeals Memo sets forth a number of adverse decisions
that prosecutors must report to Main Justice within fourteen days of the
judgment, including, inter alia: departures that reduce the sentencing
zone to one that requires no term of imprisonment; departures of two or
more criminal history categories based upon an over-representation of
the seriousness of the defendant's record; departures of three or more
offense levels based upon a "discouraged" factor, an "unmentioned" fac-
tor, or a combination of factors where no single factor justifies departure,
or an impermissible factor 166 for an offense which, prior to the departure,
resulted in an offense level of level 16; and departures in cases where that
basis for "departure has become prevalent in the district or with a partic-
ular judge.1167 If these conditions are met, the local prosecutor must file
a notice of appeal to preserve the government's right to appeal, and in all
cases where an appeal is authorized, the Ashcroft Appeals Memo re-
quires prosecutors to "vigorously and professionally pursue the
appeal."1 68
Parsing this language, the Ashcroft Appeals Memo actually does not
require prosecutors to report and appeal every downward departure.
This choice could be interpreted two ways. One possibility is that the
Department of Justice did not fully agree with the anti-downward depar-
ture spirit of the Feeney Amendment. The other choice is that in an ef-
fort to preserve resources, the Department of Justice decided to pick its
downward departure appeal battles carefully. Two pieces of evidence
suggest the latter is more likely. First, in the letter that accompanied the
Ashcroft Appeals Memo, Attorney General Ashcroft added that, "De-
partment attorneys must ensure that the Sentencing Guidelines are ap-
plied as Congress and the Sentencing Commission intended them to be
applied, regardless of whether an individual prosecutor agrees with that
policy decision. ' 169 With these words, Ashcroft acknowledged that local
federal prosecutors have contributed to the increase in departure rates by
court provided the government with advance notice of its intent to depart, the position of
the parties with respect to the downward departure, and whether the government filed or
intended to file a motion for reconsideration. PROTECT Act § 401(l)(2). The Attorney
General then had another five days to file a report on the Solicitor General's decision
regarding authorization of an appeal.
166. As defined by 18 U.S.C. § 37426)(2).
167. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors app. at 1-2 (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Ap-
peals Memo] (regarding Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing Rec-
ommendations and Sentencing Appeals). Other categories include departures in sex
offense cases and departures on remand that do not comply with the Feeney Amendment
directive on that issue. Id.
168. Id. at 4. The intermediate step required by the memorandum is that the Solicitor
General must review the case to determine whether an appeal would be appropriate and
meritorious if either the Department of Justice or local United States Attorney recom-
mends an appeal. Id.
169. Id. at 2. Similarly, in a detailed letter, the Department explained that these proce-
dures were necessary to prevent the more onerous provisions in the bill from taking effect.
This letter also denied that the new policy represents "a novel centralization of appellate
decision-making in Washington" or that the reporting requirements represent an effort to
establish "'a blacklist of judges."' Letter from Robert McCallum, Jr., Associate Attorney
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acquiescing to judicial departures. But, he declares, Department of Jus-
tice policy is now that departures are no longer acceptable simply because
they seem fair to the prosecutor on the case. The Department's desire to
limit the discretion of the line federal prosecutors around the country
closest to the case became even clearer in Ashcroft's second post-Feeney
policy memorandum.
This second memorandum, released on September 22, 2003 (the
"Charging Memo"), addresses both departures and charging policy. 170
The charging policy changes in particular are likely to exert substantial
upward pressure on federal sentences if fully implemented across the
country. With regard to non-substantial assistance departures, the Charg-
ing Memo instructs that "the circumstances in which federal prosecutors
will request or accede to downward departures in the future will be 'prop-
erly circumscribed' and 'rare' and directs prosecutors to 'affirmatively op-
pose downward adjustments that are not supported by the facts and the
law,' and not 'stand silent' with respect to such departures.' 17 1 The
Charging Memo also reiterates the existing policy that prosecutors must
identify to the court instances where they have agreed to depart so there
can be both a record and judicial review. 172
In the charging policy section of the Charging Memo, Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft wrote
The fairness Congress sought to achieve by the Sentencing Reform
Act and the PROTECT Act can be attained only if there are fair and
reasonably consistent policies with respect to the Department's deci-
sions concerning what charges to bring and how cases should be dis-
posed. Just as the sentence a defendant receives should not depend
upon which particular judge presides over the case, so too the
charges a defendant faces should not depend upon the particular
prosecutor assigned to handle the case. 173
However, the means that Ashcroft chose to achieve uniformity is tell-
ing. The new policy requires prosecutors to charge and pursue "the most
serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the
facts.' 1 74 Moreover, the "most serious offense or offenses are those that
generate the most substantial sentence under the sentencing guidelines or
mandatory minimums.' 1 75 The only time a lesser charge is permissible is
General, United States Department of Justice, to Leonidas Ralph Meecham, Director, Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts 3 (Aug. 7, 2003) (copy on file with author).
170. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, United States Department
of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Charging
Memo] (regarding Department Policy Concerning Criminal Offenses, Disposition of
Charges, and Sentencing).
171. Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 12-13 (quoting Ashcroft Charging
Memo, supra note 170, at 7).
172. Ashcroft Charging Memo, supra note 170, at 7.
173. Id. at 2.
174. Id. at 2.
175. Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 13-14 (summarizing Ashcroft
Charging Memo, supra note 170).
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when a higher charge is not "readily provable" because the prosecutor
has a good faith doubt, for legal or evidentiary reasons, as to the govern-
ment's ability to prove a charge at trial. 76 In other words, the Charging
Memo seeks to end the long standing practice of what has been called
"charge" or "fact bargaining," wherein the prosecutor and defense agree
to a factual proffer that minimizes the criminal conduct so that a lesser
Guideline or mandatory minimum statute will apply. This section of the
Charging Memo signals a return to the Thornburgh Memorandum policy
from the Bush I Administration, which had been substantially loosened
by the Reno Bluesheet. 177
However, the Thornburgh Memo policies were honored more often in
the breach in many districts. Because local U.S. Attorneys offices histori-
cally had substantial autonomy in charging and plea decisions, many were
resistant to taking directions from Washington. Currently, the Feeney re-
porting requirements and better data collection suggest that the Depart-
ment of Justice may actually have the tools to identify prosecutors and
districts that are not complying with this Main Justice directive. What
steps the Department of Justice takes to bring those offices in line will
determine how effective this reborn policy will be. Clearly, though, both
of Ashcroft's post-Feeney memos demonstrate that President Bush's Jus-
tice Department is committed to work hand-in-glove with Congress's ef-
forts both to restrict judicial discretion and to increase sentences, even to
the extent of trying to exert unprecedented control over the decisions of
local United States Attorney's Offices. As one critic of this aspect of the
Justice Department's new policy put it, "John Ashcroft seems to think
Washington, D.C. can better determine a fair sentence than a judge who
heard the case or the prosecutor who tried it."178
176. Ashcroft Charging Memo, supra note 170, at 5.
177. See supra note 93.
178. Cohen & Fields, supra, note 121 (quoting Rep. John Conyers (D. - Michigan)).
Although beyond the scope of this article, critics argue that PROTECT Act and Justice
Department's endorsement of the so-called "fast track" prosecution programs largely un-
dermines their purported commitment to reducing disparity. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Only
Suckers Pay the Sticker Price: The Effect of "Fast Track" Programs on the Future of the
Sentencing Guidelines as a Principled Sentencing System, Statement Before the United
States Sentencing Commission 1 (Sept. 23, 2003) (copy on file with author); see PROTECT
Act § 401(m)(2)(B). When authorized by the Justice Department and local U.S. Attorney,
the fast track program allows for reduced sentences for defendants who enter an early plea
in judicial districts facing an exceptional number of a specific class of cases. (For additional
criteria and procedures, see Ashcroft Charging Memo, supra note 170, at 1-2.) Prior to this
congressional authorization, a precursor fast-track program had been used in the southwest
border states to deal with a deluge of immigration and drug smuggling cases. In fact, the
Commission's Downward Departure Report suggests that more than half the increase in
the departure rate since 1980 can be attributed to these government sanctioned departures.
Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at iv-v. Now given statutory permanence, an
alien smuggler caught in Tijuana will now be entitled to receive a lower sentence than the
exact same offender arrested in San Francisco. As noted by Frank Bowman, the fast track
program abandons the Guidelines raison d'etre, to ensure that similarly situated offenders
receive the same sentence regardless of where in the federal system they are convicted.
See Bowman, supra, at 4. As he put in it in his testimony before the Commission, "The
fast-track provision of the PROTECT Act and the Department's plea bargaining policies
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2. Implementation by the Sentencing Commission
The Feeney Amendment also required the Sentencing Commission to
take a number of steps to substantially reduce the incidence of downward
departures. 179 The Sentencing Commission's response was its October
2003 emergency amendment and report.'80 In this amendment, the Sen-
tencing Commission identified several new grounds that cannot be used
as a basis for departure, including: the defendant's acceptance of respon-
sibility for the offense; the defendant's aggravating or mitigating role in
the offense; the defendant's decision, by itself, to plead guilty to the of-
fense or to enter into a plea agreement with respect to the offense; the
defendant's fulfillment of restitution obligations only to the extent re-
quired by law, including the guidelines; and the defendant's addiction to
gambling. 181 The Sentencing Commission also imposed serious hurdles
for aberrant behavior departures1 82 and departures based on the over-
representation of the defendant's criminal history.183 In addition, the
Sentencing Commission added new restrictions for departures based
upon multiple circumstances (previously referred to as a combination of
are what happens when ideological purity and political posturing collide with facts on the
ground." Id. at 4. He added:
And all this from an Administration whose public position is that public
safety demands there can be no retreat from the current lengthy sentences
for federal crimes, particularly drug crimes .... And anyone, particularly any
judge, who has the temerity to exercise discretion to reduce a sentence for a
federal felon is a lawbreaker himself who must be chastised, or according to
some in Congress, impeached.
Id. at 3.
179. The Commission report notes that it conducted an empirical study, solicited com-
ments, reviewed the literature, and held hearings before taking action. Downward Depar-
ture Report, supra note 97, at 18. The GOA reached a similar conclusion in its October
2003 report. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:
DEPARTURES FROM SENTENCING AND MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES, FISCAL YEARS
1999-2001 (Oct. 2003).
180. Downward Departure Report, supra note 97, at 18. The Commission Report also
contains a section describing the Commission's efforts and actions to address the departure
issue before the Feeney Amendment. Id. at 16-17. These included amendments to pro-
hibit departures at re-sentencing for post-sentencing rehabilitation and additional restric-
tions on departures for aberrant behavior. Id. The Commission also implemented the
changes in the sex offense Guidelines as required by the PROTECT Act. Id. at 18.
181. Id. at 74-75.
182. Id. at 76-77. Aberrant behavior departures are no longer permitted if the defen-
dant has any significant prior criminal behavior, even if the prior conduct did not result in a
federal or state felony conviction and when the defendant is subject to a mandatory term
of imprisonment of five years or more for a drug-trafficking offense, regardless of whether
the defendant meets the criteria for the safety-valve. Id. at 77.
A departure based on aberrant behavior may be warranted only if the defen-
dant committed a single criminal occurrence or single criminal transaction
that (1) was committed without significant planning; (2) was of limited dura-
tion; and (3) represented a marked deviation by the defendant from an oth-
erwise law-abiding life.
Id. For additional discussion of the new limits on this departure grounds, see id. at 76-78.
183. The Commission substantially restructured section 4A.1.3. See id. at 77-78.
Among other changes, departures based upon over-representation of criminal history are
no longer permitted if the defendant is an armed career criminal within the meaning of
section 4B1.4 or if the defendant is a repeat or dangerous sex offender against minors
within the meaning of section 4B1.5. For additional commentary, see id. at 78-79.
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factors), 84 the defendant's family ties, 85 victim's conduct,'186 coercion
and duress, and diminished capacity. 187 To further implement Feeney's
message, the Sentencing Commission restructured the departure guide-
line and added policy language' 88 that requires greater specificity and ad-
ditional documentation from judges when they depart. 89 Finally, the
accompanying Sentencing Commission report noted that its work on de-
partures would be ongoing and cited additional future refinements to
criminal history and the elimination of the aberrant behavior departure
as possible future steps.190
Voluminous in nature, the Sentencing Commission staff appears to
have attempted to faithfully execute the dictates of the Feeney Amend-
ment, while leaving the essential structure of the departure guidelines and
most existing grounds for departure intact.' 9' The key problem for
judges and defense attorneys seeking downward departures is that the
Sentencing Commission added a host of new requirements and conditions
to several frequently used grounds, such as overrepresentation of crimi-
nal history and aberrant behavior. These changes will likely disqualify
some cases from these categories, and in conjunction with the new stan-
dard of review, provide more opportunities for government appeals and
appellate reversals. Together, the changes wrought by the Feeney
Amendment, the Sentencing Commission's new guidelines, and the Jus-
184. Departures based on multiple circumstances (where no one factor merited a de-
parture), only when all the factors under consideration are already identified in the Guide-
lines as permissible grounds for departure. Id. at 74. In addition, each offender
characteristic or other circumstance "must be present individually to a substantial degree
and must make the case exceptional when considered together." Id, This type of depar-
ture, the Commission added, should be "extremely rare." Id. at 75.
185. The Commission limited factors including, inter alia, whether the offense
presented any danger to family members to distinguish these cases from those that in-
volved "hardship or suffering that is ordinarily incident to incarceration." Id. at 75-76.
186. "In addition to five previously existing factors, the court now should consider the
proportionality and reasonableness of the defendant's response to the victim's provoca-
tion." Id. at 76.
187. The new guideline requires that the diminished capacity "now must have substan-
tially contributed to the commission of the offense" and that the departure should "reflect
the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the
offense." Id. at 76.
188. The Commission restated that departures in general should be rare. Id. at 74. De-
partures are only permitted if, in addition to the court finding "that there exists an aggra-
vating or mitigating factor of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission," the court also finds that the departure will
advance the objectives sent forth in the Sentencing Reform Act. Id.
189. Id. at 73.
190. Id. at 21. The Commission identified its current priority to be immigration of-
fenses because they accounted for one third of all departures in 2001. Id.
191. "To its credit, the Commission has reaffirmed the basic principle that Congress
established in the legislation that created the Sentencing Guidelines, that [d]epartures ...
perform an integral function in the sentencing guideline system." Analysis by NACDL's
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Committee, at www.nacdl.org/downswardepartures (last
visited Jan. 21, 2004). But see Stuart Taylor, Jr, Ashcroft and Congress are Pandering to
Punitive Instincts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, at http//www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/
talyor2004-01-28.htm (noting that an Ashcroft subordinate complained that the Sentencing
Commission "had not gone far enough and threatened to go back to Congress").
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tice Department's new charging and appeals policies, move the federal
system closer to one where once charged with an offense, a defendant is
likely to receive roughly the same Guideline sentence as every other de-
fendant charged with a similar crime. Moreover, this similarity will exist
regardless of whether those closest to the case agree that this person does
really not need the substantial incarceration called for; where his or her
role in the offense was minimal; or where addiction, desperation, or per-
sonal relationships motivated their conduct more than greed or anti-so-
cial animus. It is these kinds of cases that have most distressed the
federal bench and it is this category that is most likely to increase in the
wake of the Feeney Amendment. 192 But beyond Feeney, the question
remains as to why Congress aggressively attacked a federal bench that by
now largely mirrors the conservative background and temperament of
Congress itself.
IV. THE DYNAMICS OF FEDERAL SENTENCING POLITICS
The real reasons for the Feeney Amendment, I suspect, were political
opportunism and the unreasonably punitive philosophies of Ashcroft
and his allies.193
A. THE POLITICS OF CRIME LEGISLATION
This section attempts to identify and analyze the political forces at
work on this Article's two questions: First, why do federal criminal
sentences continue to defy the laws of gravity despite ample evidence that
they are not fair or cost effective? Second, why has the judicial branch
lost discretion in virtually every significant piece of sentencing reform
legislation since 1984? The answers lie in a multifaceted mix of the polit-
ics of criminal justice combined with certain institutional incentives of
the legislative and executive branches versus disabilities of the judicial
branch. 194
Arguably, the simplest explanation could be that public opinion has
simply shifted to the right on drugs and crime. Thus, penalties are in-
creasing because Congress and the Justice Department are reacting to
what the country wants. When life-tenured judges appointed in a differ-
ent era attempt to use their discretion to undermine this policy, the politi-
cal branches respond by including restraints on judges as part of their
crime control platform. However, this view is probably too simplistic and
contrary to public opinion polls and other evidence. 195 Rather, if there is
192. See supra notes 155-56.
193. Taylor, supra note 191.
194. This is a key dynamic because there are only relatively weak groups in society that
are arrayed against harsh criminal justice policies (such as criminal defense attorneys and
prisoner's rights groups).
195. "Public opinion polls suggest that most Americans are fully capable of understand-
ing that prevention is as important as punishment, and that not all drug users deserve to
spend 10 years in prison, but politicians refuse to trust them." Susan Estrich, Willie Hor-
ton, R.IP., DENV. POST, Aug. 26, 1999, at Bl, available at 1999 WL 7892545. In addition,
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a simple answer, at least to the first question about drug penalties, it is
that as crime has become more and more politicized, elected officials on
either side of the aisle believe it is political suicide to vote to lower
sentences. Raising penalties, on the other hand, is an easy way to score
toughness points with the electorate.
In contrast to these reductionist approaches, theorists such as Jonathan
Simon believe that the underlying issue is much more complex and more
important. He argues that crime has evolved into a major platform for
reconstructing liberal governance. While not inevitable, this association
has roots in American culture, the vicissitudes of crime rates, and memo-
ries in the generational pattern of American society.196
Bringing together a diverse body of literature within political science,
criminology, and sociology, Simon argues that the nation has shifted to
"governing through crime" across a broad range of issues in a misguided
attempt to shore up perceptions of a disintegration of community.197
Others describe this underlying societal shift as a movement towards a
"culture of fear," driven by both real crime in the streets and mass hyste-
ria fed by popular culture. 198
While these broad theories generate an important perspective, the new
work of political scientist Naomi Murakawa best explains how specific
features of criminal justice politics account for why sentencing laws are
more resistant to the natural pendulum of other policy debates. 199 She
contends that the root of sentencing policy asymmetry lies in three spe-
cific ways criminal justice issues play out in the public arena.200 First, she
notes that "single criminal incidents" dominate the public debate over
the vast majority of federal judges are either Republican appointees or fairly middle of the
road Clinton nominees. Id.
196. Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1113 (2000).
197. See generally id. Simon believes governing through crime has also led to growth in
the managerial function of government and a likely exacerbation of racism, inequality, and
"the least defensible features of the old regime (patronage driven by large public unions
and election contributions."). Id. at 1143-44.
198. BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF
THE WRONG THINGS (1990); Lawrence M. Friedman & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Illegal Fictions:
Mystery Novels and the Popular Image of Crime, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1426 (2001);
Tonya L. Brito, Paranoid Parents, Phantom Menaces, and the Culture of Fear, 2000 Wis. L.
REV. 519, 519-20.
199. Murakawa found that for non-criminal issues, there is often an increase in substan-
tive legislative activity in months before an election. Naomi Murakawa, Electing to Pun-
ish: Congress, Race, and the Rise of the American Criminal Justice State ch. 3, at 32 (2003)
(unpublished dissertation, Yale University (copy on file with author). The post-election
period, however, often sees a legislative retreat, out right repeal, or if not, a counter cycle
in the next election. Id. Crime legislation on the other hand, never seems to have a de-
escalation or repeal phase, which functions "as a kind of criminal justice electoral stair-
case." Id. ch. 3, at 33.
200. Id. ch. 3, at 24 (labeling the perceptible effects of crime policy as "asymmetrical
traceability" for crime policy).
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criminal justice policy.201 Len Bias,202 Willie Horton,20 3 and Amber Hag-
erman204 are compelling and powerful stories. Mass media fuels this im-
balance because television and daily newspapers are better suited to
reporting about individual crimes than providing in-depth analysis on the
root causes of crime.20 5 Further, politicians find it much easier to link
specific crime stories to specific legislative solutions:20 6 if Willie Horton
had not been given a furlough, that woman would not have been
raped;20 7 if there had been a sex offender registry, Amber's family would
have known that a child molester lived in the neighborhood. 20 8 On the
other hand, it is much more difficult to explain that if there was more
drug treatment, more daycare, or better inner-city schools, fewer
criminals would be created. 209 And when offenders are not sent to prison
(or are released after serving time), but do not commit a new crime, there
is no immediate story to tell.210 Rather, their lives are just another exam-
ple of the day-to-day struggles of working-class life.
Second, the harm that flows from lenient crime policy usually elicits
more public anger than stories about the harm caused by overly punitive
crime policy. 211 While this equation is driven in part by a lack of sympa-
thy for criminals in general, it is also quite clear that a third element is in
play-that punitive sentencing policies overwhelmingly target disfavored
201. Id. ch. 3, at 26. A cause of the domination of "singular criminal incidents" in pub-
lic debate may be the increase in the prevalence of the news magazine television programs,
such as 48 Hours, Dateline, and 60 Minutes. Kenneth D. Tunnell, Reflections on Crime,
Criminals, and Control in Newsmagazine Television Programs, in POPULAR CULTURE,
CRIME, & JUSTICE, 111, 112-13 (Frankie Bailey & Donna Hale, eds. 1998). Featured on
these shows are "high-profile crimes and criminals ... [of a] sensational variety." Id. at
113.
202. See supra notes 46-51, and accompanying text.
203. See Murakawa, supra note 199, ch. 3, at 12.
204. Amber Hagerman was 9-years-old when she was abducted and murdered near her
home in Arlington, Texas in 1996. Patty Henetz, After Smart Case, A New Response to
Abductions, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 5, 2003, at A2, available at 2003 WL 57564336. The
Amber Alert bill was named for her. Id.
205. See Murakawa, supra note 199, ch. 3, at 13.
206. Id.
207. Id. ch. 3, at 12. "The making of Willie Horton as a symbol that outlived the cam-
paign and its promises is one of the more telling tales about the way our presidential polit-
ics really works. It was a visual symbol ... [that] was disseminated nationally" depicting
"every suburban mother's greatest fear." Martin Schram, The Making of Willie Horton,
NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 1990, at 17.
208. See Murakawa, supra note 199, ch. 3, at 12 (using an earlier example of Meagan
Kanka).
209. Id. ch. 3, at 26 (claiming "asymmetrical traceability tilts the decision calculus to-
wards less procedural protection and more capital crimes, less drug treatment and more
drug mandatory minimums").
210. Id. ch. 3, at 24 (contending "[flalling crime can be told only as story of rates; it is
impossible to tell a single incident story of a crime that did not occur").
211. Id. ch. 3, at 25. Murakawa recognizes that there has been some favorable media
coverage for sympathetic victims of the drug war (such as women who became involved
because of boyfriends) and that wrongful convictions have recently emerged as a counter
story that has generated substantial public sympathy and some efforts at reform. Id.; see
also Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, 18 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2003).
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minorities.2 12 This should be no surprise. It has been said many times
that criminal justice and race are deeply intertwined.2 13 As noted by
Dorothy Roberts, the social meaning of crime is closely tied in America
to stereotypes of racial minorities. 214 The crack penalties that have dis-
proportionately incarcerated African-Americans involved in the cocaine
trade are just the most recent example of this phenomenon.21 5
This combination of powerful crime stories and racially tinged debates
are difficult obstacles to overcome. Moreover, there are no powerful al-
lies for less punitive policies. While criminal defense organizations, pris-
oner rights, and social justice groups have done some local, grassroots
organizing on these issues, 216 little headway has been made in garnering
sufficient mainstream and national support to reverse the dominant
trends.
B. CONGRESS'S MOTIVES TO RESTRICT JUDICIAL DISCRETION
While the preceding section offers some explanations for the upward,
political pressure on criminal sentences, it does not answer why judicial
discretion has suffered as well. For that question, institutional incentives
must be examined.
One perspective is to see the attack on judicial discretion as a by-
product of the disjunction between the rhetoric and the reality of the war
on drugs. Many, if not most participants in the criminal justice system
now recognize that reliance on harsh criminal penalties will not solve the
212. Over 80% of those convicted for crack cocaine trafficking in the 1990s were black,
according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Spade, supra note 50, at 1268.
213. See, e.g., DJ Silton, US. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation
Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53 (2002) (contending "[i]nstead of responding to
the rising prison population by questioning the severity of criminal penalties, the political
atmosphere has been dominated by an enforcement-hungry policy discourse that ignores
the roots of the problem").
214. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Mainte-
nance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775 (1999); see also Tracey L. Meares &
Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Disorder in the Inner City, 32 L. & Soc'" REV. 805
(1998).
215. While there was some early evidence that crack was more dangerous than powder
cocaine, commentators have made powerful arguments that resistance to lowering the
100:1 ratio is still very much a story about the stereotyping of dangerous ghetto blacks. See
Spade, supra note 50.
216. Examples include FAMM, which played a significant role in the legislation repeal-
ing the mandatory minimums in Michigan and the NAACP Defense Fund which was in-
strumental in the release of thirty eight wrongfully convicted prisoners in Tulia, Texas.
William J. Milliken, Michigan Must Reform Harsh Drug Sentences, DETROIT NEWS, Sept.
20, 2002, at 11, available at 2002 WL 25291631. See also Deborah Hastings, How a Lying
Cop Convicted 38 of Drug Crimes; Undercover Agent Had History of Deceit, But His Word
Was All Court Needed, CHIc. SUN-TIMES, June 22, 2003, at 31, available at 2003 WL
9558085. In addition, Jeremy Travis at the Urban Institute has done much to raise public
awareness on programs designed to promote successful inmate "re-entry" into society.
Robert Moran, New Programs Aim to Give Ex-Inmates a Better Chance of Staying Out of




nation's drug problem.217 However, having whipped the voting public
into a war mentality over the issue, national politicians are desperate for
evidence that their primary solutions-more federal enforcement and
harsher sentences-will eventually work.218 Thus, when the judiciary, the
Sentencing Commission, or others suggests lowering drug sentences, 219
Congress engages in defensive finger-pointing.220 The war hasn't been
won because there are still those who are not tough enough. The war on
drugs metaphor also provides cover for these inter-branch attacks. As we
have seen with the post-September 11 restrictions on civil liberties, gov-
ernmental excesses are tolerated to a greater extent during "wartime. 221
Thus, following the adage that if you are not with us, you are against us,
judges have been adjudged the enemy in the war on drugs and therefore
can justifiably be attacked.
One interesting take on the linkage between failure of the war on drugs
and attacks on the judiciary is Collin O'Connor Udell's use of Jungian
217. See Linda Cargill, Audience Unloads on Youth Crime Bill, PORTLAND SKANNER,
Mar. 1, 1995, at 1, available at 1995 WL 15470756 (citing survey in which a majority of
prison wardens favored prevention programs over an increase in mandatory minimums for
drug crimes). In 1999, the executive director of the Law Enforcement Alliance of
America, Jim Fortis, concurred when he claimed "I believe today that we have too many
people incarcerated under these minimum-maximum sentences or maximum-minimum
sentencing objectives, and that we should give a little bit more discretion back to the
judges." Audio Tape: Talk to the Nation: What Happened to Rehabilitating America's
Prisoners (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 21, 1999), transcript available at 1999 WL 32908790;
see also Alexandara Marks, In Drug War, Treatment is Back: California Credits Treatment
with its First Drop in Prison Inmates in Two Decades, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., July 14, 2000,
at 1, available at 2000 WL 4429491 (noting that the policy shift from incarceration to treat-
ment in California was driven by "a wide range of social, religious and judicial leaders").
Recent public opinion polls report a majority of Americans believe the war on drugs is a
failure and that drug use should be treated as a disease. Drug War Report, The Pew Re-
search Center for People and the Press, Washington, D.C., Mar. 21, 2001, at http://people-
press.org/reports/display.php3?reportid=16 (last visited May 3, 2003). Traffic, the award
winning film, is the most prominent example of this contention within popular culture.
TRAFFIC (USA Films 2000). The film is filled with "acute observations about America's
hypocritical, unwinnable and generally corrupt 'drug war."' Bob Ross, "Traffic" Tops 10
Best of '01, TAMPA TRIB., Dec., 29, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL 24608328; see also
David Simpson, Departing DA Pulls No Punches, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., at http://
www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/dekalb/0104/25morgan.html (quoting a retiring county
prosecutor with twenty-one years experience in Georgia as saying "I think our whole war
on drugs needs to be looked at . . . . Juries are telling us that prosecution is not the
answer.").
218. See Robert Charles, New Drug Czar's Mission, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 2001, at
A15, available at 2001 WL 4153160.
219. Some prominent politicians, such as Gov. Gary Johnson of New Mexico, former
secretary of state George Schultz, and Baltimore mayor Kurt Schmoke, have advocated for
drug legalization. John J. Miller, The New Mexico Maverick, NAT. REV., Nov. 8, 1999, at
28, available at 1999 WL 11342427. Federal drug czar Barry McCaffery claimed that the
republican governor of New Mexico was "an embarrassment." Id. at 28. Mayor Schmoke
suffered similar criticism in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Catherine Fry, Editorial, Drug Legali-
zation Is a Scary Idea, WASH. POST, May 19, 1988, at A24, available at 1988 WL 2052085.
220. See Catherine G. Patsos, Note, The Constitutionality and Implications of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 205, 254 (1998) (quoting then Senator Bob
Dole as accusing liberal judges appointed by President Clinton of being "the root causes of
the crime explosion").
221. See Peter Margulies, Uncertain Arrivals: Immigration, Terror and Democracy After
September 11, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 481.
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psychology. 222 Central to Jungian psychology is the notion of arche-
types-patterns deep in our collective unconscious through which we
channel and categorize our experiences. 223 The shadow archetype con-
tains "those aspects of ourselves that we have repressed from conscious-
ness because we have deemed them unacceptable. ' 22 4 When a person
"campaigns vigorously, even fanatically, against what he regards as sin
and immorality [he is said to be] fighting his own shadow. 2 25 According
to Jung, projecting the shadow outward in this way is ultimately self de-
structive.226 It generates an attitude of moral superiority, rigidity, and a
loss of creativity. 227
Jung's theory of projection is relevant because projection of the
shadow is also a social phenomenon. 2 28 Thus, Udell argues that modern
legislators have been "influenced by the pull of archetypes ... because
they function as the voice of the collective. '22 9 While the criminal law
generally "provides fertile soil for the projection of the shadow arche-
type," 230 Udell believes that the modern war on crime has cast those
branded as criminals even more deeply in the psycho-social role of the
"shadow" archetype-with profound policy implications. 231 Instead of
simply deeming certain behavior unacceptable and worthy of propor-
tional punishment, the social projection of the criminal as "the monster"
generates continuous energy for harsher and harsher sentences. The re-
lated dehumanization process also provides the rationale for one-size-fits-
all mandatory minimums. 232
Udell also argues that this shadow animosity has increasingly spilled
over towards federal judges who are sometimes required by their "repre-
sentation-reinforcement role" to reject the harshest of these measures. 233
Rather than recognize the legitimate role of judges as a proper counter-
majoritarian force, Congress has extended the projection and targeted
222. Collin O'Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: Projection, Jung, and the Law,
42 ARIz. L. REV. 731 (2000).
223. Id. at 738.
224. Id. at 744-45.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 745.
227. Id. at 744.
228. Id. at 745.
229. Id. at 757. Udell analyzes jurisdiction-stripping legislation in post-conviction and
alien removal proceedings as well as the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 757-58, 768-74.
230. See id. at 750-51. "A central quest of the law is to capture, contain, and segregate
the unacceptable, to draw definitive boundaries that separate us from the 'other.' The sta-
tus of 'criminal,' is therefore "reserved for one who has crossed the boundary, is an exter-
nal manifestation or reflection of standards we carry within our own psyches." Id.
231. Id. at 751.
232. See id. Udell concludes that modern culture is "driven by the urge to punish, seg-
regate and rigidly control those to be sentenced, who represent to us those uncontrollable
impulses we all carry within us but deny." Id. at 773. Udell does not attempt to explain
why the collective legislative and societal fear of crime has increased. Other theorists have
suggested a variety of factors that have led to a greater culture of fear. See Friedman &
Rosen-Zvi, supra note 198.
233. Udell, supra note 222, at 759.
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judges for sanctions as well. 234 As evidence, Udell cites statistics that re-
flect that as the punishment wave gathered momentum from 1965 to
1988, "the percentage of persons who believed that the courts were 'too
lenient' rose from 48% to 82%."235 Thus, he argues that the Sentencing
Guidelines were but one of several jurisdiction-stripping and discretion-
reducing prophylactic measures by Congress in the service of shadow re-
pression. 236 Ultimately, Udell recognizes, that while the shadow arche-
type provides a provocative model for understanding the relationship
between criminal sanctions and judicial discretion, it is difficult to talk to
lawyers and legislators about Jungian theory and less likely that such talk
would lead to reform.2 37 Thus, I turn to more traditional modes of analy-
sis to provide tools to those that seek to both understand and change the
dynamic of federal sentencing policy.
The institutional dynamics of inter-branch relations, for example, pro-
vide a more accessible theoretical framework. Legislators almost never
deal with live defendants. At most, they select anecdotal stories to
demonstrate the need for new or higher penalties.2 38 Legislators also
generally have the worst possible offender in mind when writing criminal
code and punishment provisions.2 39 However, the actual persons charged
sometimes bear little resemblance to this archetypal worst actor in the
legislator's mind. This seems particularly true in narcotics cases. While in
1986, Congress talked about kingpins and mid-level dealers,2 40 the major-
ity of federal inmates serving drug sentences are low-level offenders such
as couriers and street-level dealers. 241 In contrast, judges must sentence
the individuals who appear before them and they are institutionally re-
quired to listen to their representatives and formally respond to their ar-
guments. These experiences may sensitize judges to factors that
legislators have not considered.2 42 Thus, to Congress, downward depart-
ing judges may appear to be soft on crime rather than seeking a just re-
sponse to the disjunction between those targeted by the laws and those
charged.
Of course, Congress could hold the executive branch responsible for
charging the "wrong" offenders, rather than the judiciary for not handing
234. Id. at 770-71.
235. Id. at 770.
236. Id. at 771-74. Udell concludes that these efforts have weakened the pivotal role
judges were meant to play as the "Constitution's counterweight to the imperious threat of
the collective will." Id. at 774.
237. See id. at 775-76.
238. See supra note 49-53 (identifying Len Bias' death as the major impetus to the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986).
239. For example, Representative Feeney discussed his amendment in terms of child-
sex offenders, while the law itself effected a much wider range of criminal activities. See
Allenbaugh, supra note 121, at 9.
240. See Sterling, supra note 52, at 411 (arguing that contrary to the subcommittee's
original intent, mandatory minimums for small quantities of drugs have encouraged law
enforcement agencies to prosecute relatively easy targets-low-level dealers-the most
easily replaced component of the drug hierarchy).
241. See supra note 62.
242. See SrITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 81-82.
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down harsh sentences. Federal prosecutors have deflected the blame by
claiming that harsh sentencing laws must apply to all drug defendants to
coerce cooperation, to send a message of deterrence to the criminal class,
and as a bulwark against "liberal judges. '243 Congress never seems to
challenge these explanations for the Justice Department's prosecutorial
priorities, not because they are convincing, but because they have no po-
litical reason to do so. William Stuntz argues on this point that criminal
justice policymaking should not be understood as a traditional right ver-
sus left phenomenon.2 44 Rather, he believes that the executive and legis-
lative branches have forged a mutually beneficial alliance that shuts the
judiciary out of criminal justice policy.2 45 He calls this the "pathological
politics of criminal law."'246 Legislators and prosecutors share the goal of
ensuring that the criminals the public wants convicted will be found guilty
and subject to harsh punishment, particularly for offenses that outrage
the public or during a period of increasing crime.247 Thus, these branches
benefit politically from increasing the scope of the criminal law together
with the broadest definition for each crime and the fewest barriers to
conviction.2 48 Moreover, the higher the potential punishment for a
crime, the higher the plea and conviction rate. Under this view, the judi-
ciary simply has no place at the table. Thus, when either prosecutors or
Congress are unhappy with any subset of sentencing decisions (or even a
single case), either can easily obtain a legislative remedy (which of late,
has been both increased penalties and limits on judicial discretion).2 49
Stuntz's view makes a lot of sense and has a certain amount of explana-
tory power. Certainly, competition between the branches for power was
contemplated by the Framers, as was the possibility that two branches
might gang up on a third for a period of time. Moreover, Stuntz's alliance
theory manifests in an institutional dimension as well. For several years
now, prosecutors from Main Justice Department and various U.S. Attor-
neys Offices have regularly been assigned (or "detailed" in the parlance
of the executive branch) as staffers to congressional committees, most
notably the House and Senate Judiciary committees. 250 On the Hill,
knowledgeable legislative assistants are the primary drafters of legislation
243. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509-10 (2001).
244. Id. at 510 ("[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefit from more and broader crimes,
and the growing marginalization of judges ... )
245. Id.
246. Id. at 505.
247. See id. at 529-40. "Legislators are better off when prosecutors are better off." Id.
at 510.
248. See id. at 512-23. The fact that criminal law is at once both "broad and deep"
results in a "shift [in] lawmaking from courts to law enforcers," "gives the prosecutors the
power to adjudicate," and "the use of the criminal justice system not primarily to make and
carry out laws, but to send signals." Id. at 512, 519-20.
249. The politics of crime "have become increasingly nationalized, with an ever greater
focus on federal law-making." Id. at 533.
250. Telephone Interview with anonymous criminal defense lobbyist (July 24, 2003).
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and in the sentencing arena, and no one knows where pockets of judicial
discretion yet reside better than prosecutors fresh from the courtroom.
The increasing sophistication and specificity with which provisions of the
Feeney Amendment and the draft version of the 2003 Victory Act2 51 have
cut back on judicial discretion can likely be ascribed at least in part to
these shared personnel.2 52
Nevertheless, Stuntz's institutional analysis does not really help explain
the vitriol of the current congressional rhetoric on judicial discretion.
Rather, this component of the debate can only be understood through the
political lens. During the Warren Court and into the early Burger years,
conservatives directed extraordinarily harsh rhetoric at the federal courts
in response to decisions such as Miranda v. Arizona253 and Roe v.
Wade,25 4 asserting apocalyptic visions of judicial usurpation of democratic
governance.255 Even after the roll-back of the Warren Court revolution
in criminal procedure,2 56 this anti-judicial rhetoric remained part of the
conservative lexicon. In this light, congressional hostility to judicial sen-
tencing discretion is part and parcel of this larger political viewpoint.
Thus, House Majority Whip Tom Delay's claims that federal "judges need
to be intimidated. . . . 'They need to uphold the Constitution.' If they
don't behave, 'we're going to go after them in a big way,"' could as easily
be part of the conservative commentary about judicial decisions about
abortion, school busing, or prison litigation.257
This link can also be better seen if one stands in the shoes of thirty
years of the far right's view of America. This group sees a seamless web
251. The Vital Interdiction of Criminal Terrorist Organizations Act of 2003 [hereinafter
"VICTORY Act"] has not been introduced yet but a draft has been circulated by the spon-
sor, Senator Orin Hatch (copy on file with author). See infra note 281 and accompanying
text for further discussion of this bill.
252. Because the Justice Department still pays their salaries, this detailing arrangement
arguably violates the spirit, if not the principle, of the separation of powers. In any event,
the result is that the interests of the judiciary and the defense bar are shut out from this
critical, first stage of the legislative process.
253. See 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
254. See 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
255. See Robert M. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41
FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 809 (1973) (noting that many claimed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), was "an opinion replete with error and fraught with dangerous implications ... in
the worst tradition of a tragic judicial aberration that periodically wounds American juris-
prudence"). Even some twenty years after the decision, Attorney General Edwin Meese
III launched a vigorous attack on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in 1985, claim-
ing the case was an example of "inventing new law." Lawrence Herman, The Supreme
Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 740-41 (1987).
256. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (overruling Warren Court era
decision on searches of container in vehicles); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(creating good faith exception to exclusionary rule by ignoring Warren Court's reliance on
judicial integrity rationale); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1981) (overruling restrictive
Warren Court case law on the use of informants' tips in probable cause determinations).
257. Biskupic, supra note 1, at Al. Justice Scalia seems to agree with some of this
critique, placing "the blame for judicial abuse of the Constitution squarely on mainstream
legal culture-the so-called 'law-trained elites' he rails against in his public speeches and in
some opinions." David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of
Scalia's Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1386 (1999).
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of related problems that are undermining society. They are against abor-
tion, welfare, homosexuals, plaintiffs lawyers, feminists, East Coast intel-
lectuals, decadent Hollywood, and illegal drug use.2 5 8 From their
perspective, the judiciary's liberal rulings, from the Miranda decision to
the recent case overturning the Texas sodomy statute,2 59 has allowed
America's moral fabric to decay and has interfered with their electoral
efforts to reverse the process.2
60
Conservative legal theorists therefore have asserted a profoundly nar-
row view of judicial power. Their basic position is unremarkable-that
unelected courts should not make policy in a democratic society. How-
ever, when the courts interpret the Constitution in ways that violate their
value system or when judges fail to use the judicial doctrines of restraint
they favor, such as the doctrines of originalism, strict constructionism,
and legislative intent in sentencing, these theorists argue that the elected
branches must respond by limiting or revoking judicial powers. Thus,
while liberals joined the early critique of sentencing disparity,26 1 a legacy
of conservative hostility to the federal courts may be the high-octane fuel
that continues to feed the battle between Congress and the judiciary and
the obstacle to a bipartisan approach founded on data and reason. 262
Further, this drive shows no signs of abating. In July 2003, House
Republicans announced a new task force "to scour the output of federal
judges for evidence of what they call 'judicial abuse." 26 3 The leader of
this group, Texas Representative Lamar Smith stated: "Many subscribe to
the notion that judges are above it all, that the judiciary is sacred and
should be left alone. We say: wrong. Shining a spotlight on the abuses
258. Some claims are both patently absurd and offensive, such as Jerry Falwell's state-
ment that "liberal civil-rights groups, homosexuals and abortion-rights supporters" were
partly responsible for the 9/11 attacks. John F. Harris, Falwell Apologizes for Remarks,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at C4, available at 2001 WL 27733158; see also Leonard Pitts,
Dear Lord, We Need a Little Help, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 28, 2003, at A13, available
at 2003 WL 60051035 (noting that Pat Robertson called for the removal of three unnamed
Supreme Court justices after the Court overturned a state law criminalizing gay sodomy).
259. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
260. On the later case, consider Senator Rick Santorum on the subject: "If the Supreme
Court says that you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home, then you have
the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have
the right to adultery. You have the right to anything." Susan Campbell, Full Rights for
Same Sex Couples, HARTFORD COURANT, July 8, 2003, at D2, available at 2003 WL
59290982.
261. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 104. Statistically, however, minorities
have suffered the greatest percentage change in sentence length since 1986. Id. at 124-25.
262. With the exception of the Judge Baer case, more mainstream Republicans and
Democrats have not engaged in the same kind of judge bashing. When it came to passing
more punitive sentencing laws, however, Clintonian Democrats, unwilling to be outflanked
on criminal justice policy, have been equal players in the upward ratcheting process. See,
e.g., V. Dion Haynes & John O'Brien, Bad Blast from the Past Back Again:
Methamphetamine a Growing Problem, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8,1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL
2714889. This political gridlock also helps explain why the Sentencing Commission has
continually lost influence, essentially since its creation.
263. Todd Gillman, GOP Group Plans to Turn Up Scrutiny on Federal Judges, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 27, 2003, available at http.www.dallasnews.com/images/gbl-logo.gif
(last visited July 28, 2003) (on file with author).
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will go a long way to correcting them .... This is the beginning of many
steps, many news conferences and many reports. '264
C. WHY THE JUDICIAL VIEWPOINT CANNOT GAIN TRACTION IN
THE DEBATE
The next question is why the judicial response to these attacks has, so
far, been fairly ineffective. Life-tenured federal judges are usually not
considered a powerless group. Drawn from the legal and political elite,
most would presume that this branch is capable of defending its interests.
However, a variety of institutional factors aside from the politics of crimi-
nal justice have rendered judges weak political actors.
Before their nomination, most federal judges had either a direct con-
nection to the recommending senator or senator's party or were visible
figures in some aspect of the public bar.265 However, after taking the
bench, whatever influence may have flowed from such associations seems
to quickly diminish. Cynically, some judges contend that they are no
longer of any use to their senators because they cannot raise money or
make endorsements. 266 Other judges believe that institutional jealousies
undermine the prior relationships. For example, one anonymous judge
claimed that elected officials, pressed to raise money and constantly cam-
paign, are resentful of the federal judge's life tenure and geographic sta-
bility. 267 Less personally, some judges claim they hear from legislators
that their arguments about fairness and discretion should be discounted
because they do not have to face voters outraged about crime.268
Personal tensions aside, judges are institutionally unsuited for the role
of lobbyists. To some extent, judges are muzzled by the Judicial Code of
Ethics. For example, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
states in pertinent part:
264. Id. This group has also recently turned to the appropriations power in its war on
the judicial independence. In August 2003, attached to a House appropriations measure,
were two amendments to "block federal funds from being used to enforce [two federal]
court decisions[; one] that found the use of 'under God' in the Pledge of Allegiance [to be]
unconstitutional[, and the other that] ordered the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court to remove the Ten Commandments from the Courthouse."' Editorial, Attack on
Judges, WASH. POST Aug. 5, 2003, at A14 (statement of John N. Hostettler (R-Ind.)), avail-
able at 2003 WL 56510566. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one
of these cases to resolve this issue. Newdow v. United States Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003).
265. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 10 (1997). The long tradition has
been for the Senator of the President's party to have substantial input on open federal
judgeships in their state. Id. Some presidents virtually allowed senators to designate the
nominee, while others allowed input from other sources. Id. In modern era, some Sena-
tors have created advisory panels to make recommendations, which has opened up judge-
ships to a wider range of lawyers who are well respected, but less politically active. Id. at
210-11.
266. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Sept. 6, 2002) (notes on file with author).
267. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Sept. 4, 2002) (notes on file with author).
268. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Sept. 11, 2002) (notes on file with
author).
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[A] judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or
impending action .... This proscription does not extend to public
statements made in the course of the judge's official duties, to the
explanation of court procedures, or to a scholarly presentation made
for purposes of legal education.269
While comments that a sentence required by law is too harsh might not
constitute "comment on the merits," many judges believe the Code of
Conduct requires them to maintain a scrupulous aura of impartiality so
that litigants before them do not question the motivation for an adverse
ruling.270 Because the Justice Department is a constant party before the
federal courts, many judges therefore believe it is inappropriate to publi-
cally disagree with the drug laws or prosecutorial charging policies. 271
Some reticence, however, seems to be as much temperamental as it is
formally required. Federal judges have largely retreated from the conflict
inherent in practice and politics. For public officials, they lead a some-
what cloistered life. They are given domain over a patch of earth know as
their courtroom and all who enter must obey. This sheltered but power-
ful existence is quite at odds with the role of supplicant/advocate/deal
maker, in which lobbyists live before Congress. In addition, most judges
are leery of speaking to the press. They feel that reporters are in search
of sound bites, and are not interested in or capable of conveying the com-
plexity of fact and law that judges must consider in rendering a decision.
Thus, they fear that the headline might read, "Judge Releases Child Mo-
lester," when the underlying story is in fact very different.
While these factors may make individual judges ineffective lobbyists,
the modern federal judiciary has a variety of official organs at its disposal,
and in fact, prior to the Feeney Amendment, the Judicial Conference 272
and the Federal Judicial Center2 73 had taken positions against mandatory
minimums. But, arguably, neither of these bodies have been particularly
effective or aggressive on sentencing issues. Certainly, the organized ju-
diciary must proceed cautiously. Given the institutional role of the judici-
269. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(6) (1973). The
commentary states this admonition should hold until the completion of the appellate pro-
cess. Id. Canon 3(A)(6) cmt. Some judges are hesitant to comment on criminal cases even
after the direct appeal is concluded because many defendants then file post-conviction pe-
titions that are assigned back to the sentencing judge. Id.
270. "A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high stan-
dards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary will be preserved." Id. Canon 1. "A judge should respect
and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Id. Canon 2(A). "A judge
should be faithful to and maintain professional competence in the law, and should not be
swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism." Id. Canon 3(A)(2).
271. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Dec. 18, 2002) (notes on file with
author).
272. The Judicial Conference "serves as the principal policymaking body concerned
with the administration of the United States courts." See http://www.uscourts.gov/jud-
conf.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
273. The Federal Judicial Center is "the education and research agency of the federal
courts." See Federal Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
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ary as the arbiter of disputes, its official representatives should rightly
show tremendous restraint before taking policy positions.274 Moreover, in
light of the diversity and changing membership of the federal bench due
to appointments and retirements, it is difficult to garner a consensus on
any issue. Also, it remains dangerous to announce a position what might
change in just a few years. On the issue of sentencing discretion, judicial
complaints about loss of discretion could also too easily sound like carp-
ing about their loss of power, or worse, loss of power to impose personal
philosophical sentencing preferences. Moreover, while there is powerful
evidence that discretion has not disappeared from sentencing, but rather
has been transferred to the prosecution and police,2 75 these arguments
might appear less persuasive coming from the branch seeking to regain
what it has lost.
Conversely, it is also probably true that the organized bench's voice,
prior to the Feeney Amendment, has been more muted on sentencing
than it needed. Some judges believe that the bench had become too cyni-
cal and too disheartened after years of congressional attacks to fight
back.2 76 Certainly, there is a perception that more judges have been re-
tiring early or returning to private practice. However, to some extent, the
judiciary has been reserving its political capital for issues of more direct
self-interest, such as judicial salaries. 277 Further, it cannot be ignored that
Judicial Conference committees and the Federal Judicial Center are con-
trolled by Chief Justice Rehnquist.278 While this Chief Justice has con-
sistently voiced opposition to mandatory sentencing,279 prior to the
Feeney Amendment, he has not been particularly critical of the Guide-
lines or harsh sentences for drug offenders. In fact, it seems fairly clear
that he largely agrees with the crime control and social policy agenda of
274. See generally Judith Resnick, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, In-
validating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 269, 277 (2000) (cautioning
that the shift of the federal judiciary from a posture of hesitancy about playing much of an
institutional role in suggesting what federal rights Congress should create (or abolish) to
the current posture of being a 'programmatic judiciary,' regularly advising Congress not to
authorize access to the federal courts for certain sets of potential rights holders" is ill-
advised).
275. See notes 248 and accompanying text.
276. Sentencing is also not the sole function of the federal courts. Civil cases and trials
consume much of a judge's time, thus sentencing is not necessarily a daily discouragement.
See Dayton, supra note 71, at 762-63. Moreover, those judges most upset by sentencing
have the option of returning to practice or retiring and not hearing any more criminal
cases. See Martin, supra note 132, at A31.
277. In private meetings with judges who feel strongly about sentencing issues, several
noted that pay and facilities comes up in meetings with their local representatives far more
than sentencing. Interviews with anonymous federal judges (notes on file with author).
Judicial salaries in particular have been a sore issue since Congress tied its pay to judicial
pay. See Martin, supra note 132, at A31. Some commentators and lobbyists have privately
suggested that judicial reaction to the Feeney Amendment was initially muted because the
issue of a judicial pay raise was before Congress again. Id.
278. The Federal Judges Association, an independent organization open to all Article
III Judges, has been more outspoken on sentencing issues. See Federal Judges Association,
http://federaljudgesassoc.org/about.html (Last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
279. See supra note 79.
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the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Thus, his disagreement
with the federalization of crime and mandatory minimums is more about
their adverse impact on the workload of the federal bench than distress
over limits on judicial power or increasing incarceration rates. As a re-
sult, judges who have expressed more radical views on drugs and discre-
tion have not been appointed to powerful positions on these bodies.280
As such, the judicial perspective on federal sentencing has had minimal
public or legislative influence. The final issue is whether the Feeney
Amendment was sufficiently radically jarring to prompt a real change in
judicial behavior.
V. THE PROSPECT FOR RETURNING SENTENCING
DISCRETION TO THE COURTS
The previous sections painted a bleak picture of the current trends in
sentencing policy and the impact of judicial voice on the debate. Never-
theless, there is some evidence that conditions are changing, albeit slowly,
offering some hope for bringing balance back to federal criminal justice
policy over the next few years.281
First, at the state level, there is significant activity and some real sen-
tencing reform. The weak economy has put states under severe budget-
ary pressure, and they are looking for cuts in areas that were previously
off limits, such as prisons. Thus, in 2003, a number of states granted
emergency paroles for non-violent offenders as a cost-saving measure. 282
Others are considering prison-building moratoriums, 283 and a few have
rethought or are rethinking their drug laws. The leading example of the
latter is Michigan repealing its infamous "650 lifer" law,284 which had
280. Interview with anonymous federal judge (Dec. 11, 2002) (notes on file with
author).
281. On the other hand, things may get worse before they get better. In the summer of
2003, Senator Hatch circulated a draft copy of the VICTORY Act which contains a section
on sentencing. Vital Interdiction of Criminal Terrorist Organizations Act 2003, S., 108th
Cong. §§ 103, 305, 506 (draft June 27, 2003) (on file with author). If passed as drafted, the
VICTORY Act would repeal or limit many of the steps taken by the Sentencing Commis-
sion over the past few years to ameliorate the sentences of low-level offenders. Id. § 305.
For example, the bill inter alia removes the cap amendment for which Judge Rosenbaum
testified, removes the two point guideline reduction for the safety valve, eliminates the
safety valve entirely for defendants with any criminal history points, requires government
certification before the court can grant the safety valve, and extends the relevant conduct
provisions to events that predate the defendants entry into the conspiracy if the defendant
was aware of the previous activity. Id. §§ 303, 305, 307. This last provision is particularly
significant. For example, a defendant who joined a pre-existing conspiracy knowing it dis-
tributed hundreds of pounds of marijuana but only himself distributes one ounce before his
arrest would nevertheless be subject to a Guideline sentence for the entire amount distrib-
uted by the group to that point. Id.
282. See, e.g., James Jefferson, Per Routine, Prison Lets Inmates Out Early, CoM. AP-
PEAL, May 29, 2003, at B6, available at 2003 WL 18427436 (reporting the state of Tennessee
has let over 500 inmates out early since 1998).
283. See Green Party Candidate Seeks State Senate Seat; Treen Grandson Joins Race
Against Boissiere, TIMES PICAYUNE, Aug. 12, 2003, at 01, available at 2003 WL 60058576.
284. See Michigan v. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding Michigan's harsh
mandatory minimums for drug offenses did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
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vied for title as the harshest drug penalty in the nation.285 A coalition of
fiscal conservatives, including an original sponsor of the bill, and public
interest groups, convinced the Michigan legislature that this law was both
too costly and unnecessarily harsh.286 As a result, many inmates who had
served substantial terms were released. 287
In the not too distant past, the federal budget deficit was a viable na-
tional political issue. While federal red ink is again flowing, it is unlikely
that a pure economic argument that sets prison costs against public safety
will appeal to a jittery public. Rather, sentencing reform advocates must
show that a more selective use of prison sentences is both smarter, i.e.,
safer criminal justice policy, as well as less costly.288 There is some evi-
dence the public may be more receptive to this message than in the past.
Recent popular movies and television shows, such as Traffc, 289 The West
Wing,290 and Court TV's Guilt by Association291 reflect a growing aware-
ness and cynicism about the drug war. In addition, there has been more
sympathetic news coverage on issues related to over-incarceration. For
example, President Clinton's final pardons included a number of women
who had received harsh sentences for their minor participation in a con-
spiracy run by their boyfriends or husbands. 292 In addition, the conse-
quences of popular three-strikes provisions are now becoming apparent
in stories about the "graying" of the prison population.293 Thus, much
like the financial analysts who believed that the internet boom consti-
tuted a new market paradigm, it may be that theorists such as Stuntz and
Murakawa are wrong that criminal justice policy is qualitatively different.
285. Stacey Range, Repeal of Drug Laws Frees Felons, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 2, 2003, at
1, available at 2003 WL 6805880.
286. Heinlein, supra note 29, at 1.
287. The repeal of these drug laws will result in the release of over 1,250 nonviolent
drug offenders. See Range, supra note 285, at 1.
288. Nevertheless, changing federal sentencing policy will be much harder than reform
in the states. The size of the federal government, and its control over the printing presses,
makes it less susceptible to budgetary pressures. Moreover, the political appeal of tough
on crime rhetoric is hard to combat.
289. TRAFFIC (USA Films 2000); see also supra note 217.
290. On January 14, 2004, The West Wing episode showed President Bartlett, just before
the State of the Union Address, deciding whether to veto a popular piece of legislation
because it contains an amendment limiting judicial discretion in sentencing. He decries
the "War on Judges" being waged by some in Congress. As a signal of the seriousness of
his purpose in opposing long mandatory sentences, he also considers commuting the
sentences of a number of drug offenders (as recommended by the Justice Department).
The episode includes a scene in which the President talks to the President of FAMM,
whose sister is serving a mandatory minimum drug sentence. It also includes a scene in
which the President discusses the Justice Department's clemency recommendations with
the Pardon Attorney.
291. See Kevin McDonough, 'Guilt' Focuses on Justice Run Amok, CHARLESTON GA-
ZETTE, May 13, 2002, at 5D, available at 2002 WL 5187412.
292. See, e.g., Andrew Cain & Jeremy Seper, Clinton Pardons Rostenkowski: Ex-Law-
yer Pleaded Guilty to Two Counts of Mail Fraud, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at Al,
available at 2000 WL 4712552 (reporting the pardons of Kemba Smith and Dorothy
Gaines).
293. Jeff S. Erger & Randall R. Berger, Geriatric Nursing in Prisons is a Growing Con-
cern, CORRS. TODAY, Dec. 1, 2002, at 122, available at 2002 WL 22633164.
[Vol. 57
THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR ON CRIME
In fact, it may turn out that the criminal justice pendulum swings too-
just that when it swung to the right this time, it went farther and stayed
longer than ever before.
There is also scientific support that there is a shift in public opinion
occurring. A polling study commissioned by the Open Society Institute
in 2002 suggests that Americans are arriving at a fundamentally different
view of the nation's crime problem than in the anti-crime heyday of the
1980s and 1990s. 294 Conducted by the Peter D. Hart group, the study's
three conclusions are as follows:
(1) that the public now believes we should be addressing the under-
lying causes of crime rather than the symptoms;
(2) prevention rather than punishment or enforcement seems to be
the public's top priority; and
(3) Americans are reconsidering the wisdom of harsh sentences as
the centerpiece of the nation's crime strategy, especially for non-
violent offenders. 295
Some of the change in public opinion may also be the result of a better
focus to the dollars directed towards criminal justice reform. For exam-
ple, the success of California Proposition 36 in 2000, which requires drug
treatment rather than incarceration for first-time offenders arrested for
drug possession, has been attributed, in part, to the substantial out-of-
state funding sources that enabled its proponents to mount an effective
publicity campaign.296 The same may be true of the Michigan reform leg-
islation that benefited from staffing from a national public interest
group. 297 New, powerful voices have entered the debate as well. Hip-
hop musicians, such as Russell Simmons, Jay-Z, and P. Diddy, played a
well publicized role this past year in the perennial efforts to reform New
York's Rockefeller drug laws.298
But as shown by the reform drive in Michigan, broad coalitions beyond
the usual suspects are required for success. That reality seems to be sink-
ing into the criminal justice public interest community. Criminal justice
reform groups, the long isolated beacons of the left, have begun to recog-
nize the need to work across the political spectrum and seek unlikely alli-
294. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, The New Politics of Criminal Justice; A Re-
search and Messaging Report for the Open Soc'y Inst., Feb. 2002 (on file with author).
295. Peter D. Hart Research Associates, The New Politics of Criminal Justice; Sum-
mary of Findings, Jan. 2002, at 1 (on file with author).
296. Three wealthy activists, George Soros, Peter Lewis, and John Sperling, funded the
political campaign in California and have spent money for similar reforms in Ohio, Florida,
and Michigan. David Bank, Counterattack: Soros, Two Rich Allies Fund a Growing War on
the War on Drugs, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2864952.
297. FAMM "lead a long grass roots effort to bring about the change" in the mandatory
minimums. See Heinlein, supra note 29, at 1. Not all of these efforts are as successful. See
Joe Burchell, Prop 202 Alive; 200, 201 Aren't, ARz. DAILY STAR, Nov. 6, 2002, at Al,
available at 2002 WL 12828571 (reporting the defeat of a medical marijuana initiative in
Arizona after similar initiatives in both 1996 and 1998 had been approved by Arizona
voters).
298. See Johnnie L. Roberts, Beyond Definition, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 2003, at 40, avail-
able at 2003 WL 8639505.
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ances. At the federal level, the best example are efforts to assist released
inmates acclimate to freedom. Grouped under the umbrella of "re-entry"
programs, a variety of initiatives have gathered support from conserva-
tives and religious groups, as well as some federal funding. 299
What is still missing at this point, however, is a compelling refocusing
of the debate and a political leader. For federal reform to succeed, the
issue must first be recast as something other than about "liberal" judges
and public safety. One simple truth that could make a difference is that
federal law enforcement actually has no discernable impact on local
crime rates. This is because most crime, especially most drug crimes, are
still prosecuted in state courts. 300 Unfortunately, years of national politi-
cians campaigning on law and order issues has resulted in a lack of differ-
entiation between state and federal prosecutorial authority (except that a
"federal" case seems more serious). Second, the issue could use a na-
tional spokesperson, preferably one with impeccable conservative or
crime-fighting credentials. What I envision is a John McCain-like figure
who could explain how, once again, the inside-the-Beltway politicians
have misled the public-in this instance, about effectiveness of their over-
incarceration strategy, while wasting billions of dollars in the process. 301
But the sentencing reform movement also needs a positive and creative
dimension. One obvious linkage is to the re-entry movement which has
been generating positive attention across the political spectrum. A focus
on re-entry forces legislators and citizens to recognize that virtually all
drug offenders will ultimately be released back into the community. The
point that could be made more strongly, however, is that the longer a
prisoner is incarcerated, the more difficult it becomes for him or her to
re-acclimate to society upon release. Thus, shorter sentences may actu-
ally be more cost effective in the long run.
There may also be opportunities for linkage outside the criminal justice
arena. Moreover, even ideas that at first glance might be offensive to
some constituencies could be used to stimulate reconsideration of estab-
299. A recent bill to fund housing for released inmates was cosponsored by conserva-
tive congressman and supported by Jack Kemp. Kemp Urges Congress to Address Ex-
offender Re-Entry Crisis, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 19, 2003, available at 2003 WL 55657804.
For more information on the re-entry movement, see supra note 216. The Justice Depart-
ment granted $100 million in federal funds last year to state reentry projects. Laurie
Robinson, Gazing into the Legislative Crystal Ball, CORRS. TODAY, Dec. 1, 2002, at 62,
available at 2002 WL 22633149.
300. Opponents might counter that federal policies matter because they set the tone for
state policies by imitation or incentives. For example, many states have adopted the fed-
eral truth in sentencing approach, which abolishes parole, in part, because of financial in-
centives offered by the federal government. See Susan Turner et al., The Impact of Trust
and Sentencing and Three Strikes Legislation: Prison Populations, State Budgets and Crime
Rates, 11 STAN L. & POL. REV. 75, 76 (1999).
301. One newspaper has called for Bill Clinton to play this role, noting that since leav-
ing office, he has moved left on a variety of issues including the federal sentencing guide-
lines. Zev Chafetz Editorial, Wrapping Up Bilk A Future as New Voice of Liberals, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4674117. Additionally, "Free to speak his
mind, Clinton is poised to provide U.S. liberalism with what it has lacked since the deaths
of the Rev. Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy-a truly effective spokesman." Id.
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lished views. One example of this kind of idea would be a proposal to
form a "Nisei brigade" 30 2 made up of federal drug offenders. To appeal
to conservatives, one could argue that the war on terrorism requires that
we resolve festering domestic issues such as the drug war. Moreover, the
brigade would take only federal drug offenders who can demonstrate
through their rehabilitative efforts that they are ready and able to com-
plete a period of time in military service in exchange for commutation of
their sentences. 303 In addition, rather than simple pardons or wholesale
releases, such prisoners would be required to perform a service to obtain
release. To appease liberals, the program could not be a modern version
of Lee Marvin's Dirty Dozen, with dangerous prisoners being chosen for
suicide missions in exchange for their freedom. Rather, the value of
these drug offender brigades could be realized in, for example, rebuilding
roads in Afghanistan and serving as peace-keeping troops rather than
fighting in Baghdad. 30 4 A successful drug offender brigade, like Nisei
units in WWII, might help undo the scourge stereotype of drug offenders
and thus advance the prospects for meaningful reform. My point is re-
gardless of whether this particular idea is viewed favorably (or whether it
is even feasible), sentencing reformers need fresh ideas to recapture the
debate and a leader to promote these ideas. Unlike in Michigan, how-
ever, no well-known legislative proponents of mandatory minimums or
similarly credentialed current or former office holder has stepped for-
ward in a mea culpa or with a breakthrough program for reform. With-
out either, the near term prospects for significant federal, as opposed to
state reform, remains weak.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN THE JUDICIARY DO?
This article began with two premises shared by the large majority of
federal judges and academic commentators. First, that Congress has
taken too much sentencing discretion from federal judges. Second, that
302. During WWII, the United States military formed special units of Japanese-Ameri-
cans that included many men who had been imprisoned in the internment camps. The
heroism of the all-Nisei military units, the 442nd Regimental Combat Team and its prede-
cessor, the 100 Infantry Battalion from Hawaii is renowned. Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbol-
ism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing" of Arab Americans as
"Terrorists," 8 AsIAN L.J. 1, 5 (2001). "These were, per capita, the most decorated units in
World War II, distinguishing themselves by, among other acts, saving the 'lost battalion' of
Texas Rangers, and being the first to reach the Nazi concentration camp at Dachau." Id.
303. There are credible reasons to believe a drug offender brigade could succeed. For
starters, most of those swept into prison by the war on drugs were not hardened criminals,
but marginal participants in an extensive underground economy. Others troubled by ad-
diction, have nevertheless made real progress during their lengthy incarceration through
education and drug treatment and are ready to be released.
304. These would be a highly motivated group of soldiers, with keen awareness that any
failure, such as a single positive drug test, would send them back to prison. Moreover, the
military is a perfect re-entry program, providing a job, a home, and a structured environ-
ment with which prisoners are already familiar. Most importantly, it would return to them
the community and self respect that is essential to avoiding recidivism. Some might find it
ironic to take non-violent drug offenders and train them to kill for the country that impris-
oned them. But when all other means of persuasion fail, irony has a certain power.
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sentences for many drug crimes are longer than necessary to accomplish
any penalogical purpose, particularly for the low-level offenders that con-
stitute more than half the federal prison population. As a result, since
1986, judges have regularly been required to impose sentences they be-
lieve are unnecessarily harsh yet they are powerless to alter. The body of
the article then offered explanations for these developments and dis-
cussed the combination of conditions that are likely required for a para-
digm shift.
This Conclusion attempts to answer one final question: Can federal
judges have a greater impact on sentencing policy? Certainly, given the
institutional restraints on the judiciary branch, federal judges cannot take
the point position in this debate. Federal judges, however, are well-situ-
ated to contribute to two critical and related tasks necessary for sentenc-
ing reform. First, they can help to lay the foundation for the reeducation
of the public about federal criminal justice policy. Second, through their
institutional and individual voices, they can provide political cover for a
politician brave and unconventional enough to take on this issue.
While for many years a vocal minority of judges have doggedly under-
taken these tasks, the Feeney Amendment seems to have crossed a line in
the sand for many members of the judiciary. Prior to passage, the Execu-
tive Committee of the Judicial Conference, Chief Justice Rehnquist,30 5
the Federal Judges Association, the current and past chairs of the Sen-
tencing Commission, and the voting members of the Sentencing Commis-
sion all wrote separate letters opposing the bill's restrictions on judicial
discretion as well as the reporting requirements. 30 6 In September 2003,
the full Judicial Conference took up the issue and formally voted to ask
Congress to repeal the bill.30 7
The most prominent example of the post-Feeney Amendment judicial
response, however, was Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy's key-
note address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting in August
2003. Kennedy, a conservative Reagan appointee, spoke in detail about
the consequences of over-incarceration and concluded that, "[o]ur re-
sources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too
305. Rehnquist has continued to criticize the Feeney Amendment. "In unusually
pointed terms," he condemned the provisions that place judges under special scrutiny
when they lower sentences, stating that the act "could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-
considered effort to intimidate individual judges in the performance of their duties." Linda
Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004,
at A14, available at http://nytimes.com/2004/01/01/politics/01SCOT.html.
306. Letters on file with author and available at www.nacdl.org.
307. News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Conference
Seeks Restoration of Judges' Sentencing Authority (Sept. 23, 2003), available at
www.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/jc903.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2004); see also Mark Ham-
blett, Federal Judges Attack Sentencing Restrictions Judicial Conference Calls for Repeal of
the Feeney Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 2003, available at http://www.law.comljsp/arti-
cle?id=106321 2079768. They also indicated their support for pending bills that repealed
many of Feeney's provisions. See The Judicial Use of Discretion to Guarantee Equity in
Sentencing Act of 2003 ("JUDGES Act"), S. 1086, H.R. 2213, 108th Cong (2003).
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long. ' 30 8 While he agreed that federal sentencing guidelines are neces-
sary, he argued that they should be revised downward, but in too many
cases, mandatory minimum sentences simply "are unwise and unjust. 309
Lastly, he called the transfer of sentencing discretion from judges to fed-
eral prosecutors misguided and noted that these prosecutors are often not
much older than the defendants.310 The trial judge "is the one actor in
the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent,
open, and reasoned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be
with the judge, not the prosecutor."'311 Justice Kennedy concluded with a
request that the ABA study the matter and then ask Congress to repeal
mandatory minimums and the President to reinvigorate the pardon pro-
cess so that some already serving these sentences might be released. 31 2
Statements by Supreme Court Justices, 313 the organized judiciary, and
prominent judicial associations garner the most press and therefore are
308. Associate Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting 4 (Aug. 9, 2003), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
sp_08-09-03.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 5.
311. Id. Certainly, between entirely hidden discretion exercised in the prosecutor's of-
fice and the exercise of the pre-Guidelines, unfettered discretion of a sentencing judge, the
latter is still more transparent. However, under the Guidelines, the judge's sentencing de-
cisions are even more transparent. That is why many sentencing reformers still believe in
some type of guidelines system but believe the current one is flawed first by the distorting
presence of mandatory minimums and by a misguided attempt to continue to squeeze de-
partures out of a system that still needs them to ensure fairness. See Miller & Wright,
supra note 98.
312. Id. The ABA established the Commission, which held hearings in Washington,
D.C. in November 2003. See Federal Sentencing Issues Discussed at ABA Hearings, CRIM.
L. REP., Nov. 19, 2003, at 127. Some commentators find hope that a prominent conserva-
tive jurist like Justice Kennedy is willing to speak out on this issue. As noted by Frank
Bowman:
The PROTECT Act and the Ashcroft memo are the creations of politicians
who want to transform the guidelines into a one-way rachet, raising, but
never lowering, sentences. They see partisan advantage in posturing as
"tough on crime" and so, like children with their fingers stuck in their ears
chanting, "I can't hear you," they refuse to listen to those who know the
American criminal justice system best. One can only hope that voices like
Justice Kennedy will at last grab their attention.
Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Ensuring the Punishment Fits the Crime, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31,
2003, available at 2003 WL 7718269.
Less widely covered but in the same month, the International Commission of Jurists
wrote to President Bush to complain about the Justice Department's implementation of
the Feeney Amendment. The letter states that the Commission is "extremely concerned
that the Attorney General's directive to federal prosecutors to compile for the Justice De-
partment, in effect a 'blacklist' of lenient judges and jurisdictions constitutes a serious
infringement on the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law." Letter from Inter-
national Commission of Jurists, to President George W. Bush 2 (Aug. 18, 2003) (issued as a
press release, copy on file with author).
313. Not long after Justice Kennedy's speech, Justice Breyer also criticized mandatory
minimums in a speech at Harvard's Kennedy School. He stated that "There has to be oil in
the gears .... There has to be room for the unusual or exceptional case." Martin Finucane,
Supreme Court Justice Says Judges Need More Flexibility, WASH. POST Sept. 22, 2003, avail-
able at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artices/A46137-2003Sept.html. Justice Breyer,
as a member of the first Sentencing Commission, is considered the Justice with the deepest
expertise in sentencing issues.
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likely to have the greatest impact. In comparison, lower federal court
judges, however, have also been making important but less publicized ef-
forts over the past two years. In May 2002, twenty-eight former United
States Attorneys, 314 now federal circuit and district court judges signed a
joint letter addressed to the Sentencing Commission asserting their belief
that "the current disparity between powder cocaine and crack cocaine, in
both the mandatory minimum statutes and the guidelines, cannot be justi-
fied and results in sentences that are unjust and do not serve society's
interest. '315 The letter states that the solution was not to raise penalties
for powder because such punishment is already "severe and should not be
increased. ' 316 These judges were appointed by every President between
Nixon and Clinton and included a significant number of Reagan appoin-
tees.317 Bastions of their legal communities with unimpeachable crime
fighting credentials before their appointment, there could not be a more
credible group to speak on this issue. While the existence of this joint
letter is known in policy circles, it received no discernable press
coverage. 3
18
With better press coverage, this kind of letter is a potentially effective
and safe avenue for judges seeking to amplify their collective voices. Par-
ticularly in the aftermath of the Judge Rosenbaum debacle, individual
federal judges may be even more reticent to testify before Congress.
However, as in all political ventures, there is safety in numbers. None of
these twenty-eight judges were threatened with congressional subpoenas
for signing the letter.319 Moreover, the crack letter was addressed to the
314. These judges included, like Judge Rosenbaum, the chief federal prosecutor for a
federal district who are appointed by the President. There are also numerous district court
judges who served as Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Letter from Judge Raymond J. Dearie,
United States District Judge, to Diana E. Murphy, Chairperson, United States Sentencing
Commission (Apr. 15, 2002) (citing opposition of twenty eight former United States Attor-
neys to the crack/powder cocaine disparity); see also Carl Tobias, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
429, 456 ("[M]any federal judges actually are former United States Attorneys or worked in
the Offices as assistant prosecutors .... "). Tobias notes that "[o]f the 774 federal district
judges currently on the bench, 175 have worked as United States Attorneys or Assistant
United States Attorneys." Tobias, supra, at 456 n.149.
315. Statement to the United States Sentencing Commission Concerning the Penalties
for Powder and Crack Cocaine Violations Submitted by Certain United States Circuit
Court of Appeals and District Court Judges Who Previously Served as United States At-
torneys 1 (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Letter from Circuit and District Court Judges] (on
file with author).
316. Id. at 2.
317. The judges who signed the letter are as follows: Michael Daly Hawkins, Boyce F.
Martin, Jr. Gilbert S. Merritt, Jon. 0. Newman, Raymond L. Acosta, Sarah Evans Barker,
Walter E. Black, Jr., Catherine C. Blake, Clarence A. Brimmer, Robert J. Cindrich, John
T. Curtin, Glen H. Davidson, Raymond J. Dearie, Gustave Diamond, Peter C. Dorsey,
John Hannah, Jr. William W. Justice, William C. Lee, William T. Moore, Frederick J. Motz,
Alan H. Nevas, Manuel L. Real, James M. Rosenbaum, Barefoot Sanders, Fred J. Scullin,
Jr., Donald E. Walter, Rodney S. Webb, George E. Woods. Id. at 3-4.
318. A Westlaw search conducted in various databases resulted in no article about this
letter although a similar letter written in 1997 by many of the same judges was reported in
one paper. Deborah Pines, Judges Seek Equity in Cocaine Sentences, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24,
1997, at 1.
319. Judge Rosenbaum, however, was a signatory of this letter. Letter from Circuit and
District Court Judges, supra note 315, at 4.
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Sentencing Commission, an entity housed in the judicial branch, and
therefore, arguably these judges were still operating within institutional
channels.
The other lesson that emerges from a comparison of the judges' crack/
powder letter with Judge Rosenbaum's experience is to keep the message
simple. Rather than provide individual crack cases, which House staffers
might then pick apart, these former U.S. Attorneys simply made broad
policy arguments that relied on their years of experience and credibility
as former prosecutors. Judges, used to dealing with individual cases, need
to recognize that the debate sometimes needs to take place at a higher
level of generality. One way for this to happen is for groups of judges
with similar backgrounds to write similarly constructed letters on sentenc-
ing issues to the Sentencing Commission or Congress. For example, there
are a significant number of federal judges who were either state judges,
state legislators, or partners in a law firm. Each of these groups might
have their own opinion regarding judicial discretion or over-incarceration
of drug offenders. Former state legislators may be inclined to view the
drug issue as an issue of federalism, while former civil litigation law prac-
titioners may be more troubled by the clogging of the federal courts with
minor narcotics cases. If joint action is to be taken, however, then federal
judges must counter their normal inclination to work and speak alone.
For those judges not comfortable with joining a public letter, however,
there is another forum in which individual judges have been articulating
their opposition to the current sentencing regime-their own courtrooms.
In hundreds of sentencings since 1986, judges have stated on the record
that if they had the discretion, they would have imposed a sentence less
than the one required by the Guidelines or mandatory minimum statute.
These statements vary from judicial outrage at the draconian sentence
required 320 to what sounds like a civics lesson for the audience, directing
320. For example:
I believe, that there is no question that this is an unjust, unfair sentence .... I
think it is shameful that we've come to this. It is simply a product, in my
estimation, of a form of mass hysteria and the-it's also very interesting that
it's a product of the desire to make everything perfect and fair to defendants
because judges apparently couldn't do that using their own judgment. ...
And there has to be a way where judges can-when something is terribly
wrong, terribly wrong and this is an instance where I think it is terribly wrong
for whatever its worth. There has to be a way to set aside the computer and
the numbers game and all the little categories and way what is right. And
this case cries out for something of that sort.
Sentencing Tr. at 297-98, United States v. Billy Thornton Langston, Cr. 93-209-Kn (Aug.
29, 1994, C.D. Cal.) (statement of Judge David V. Kenyon). During
The judges in this system no longer actually impose sentences that have any-
thing to do with what one might call traditional concepts of individualized
justice, but have to deal with what Congress orders us to do, and Congress
has the power to write the checks and Congress has the power to tell us what
to do and they have told us what to do and I've got to follow the law ....
There is no way I would sentence you to 180 months in prison. That is well
beyond the pale.
Sentencing Tr. at 17-18, United States v. Horne, S-00-0113 (Aug. 30, 2000, D. Md.) (state-
ment of District Judge Frederick Smalkin).
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the families of the defendant to articulate their displeasure with Con-
gress, the President, and in the voting booth.321 While some of these
comments are reported in the press, most are heard just by the defendant
(for whom they offer little solace), or the families, who are usually too
busy coping with the difficulties of an incarcerated family member to be-
come political activists. Nevertheless, these statements are also poten-
tially potent tools for reformers or a politician looking for cover for
several reasons.
First, like the signatories of the crack letter, many of these judges have
impeccable conservative credentials that insulate them from an assertion
that their desire to impose a lesser sentence in a particular case equates
with being soft on crime. In addition, even more so than the crack letter,
these statements were made during the performance of the judge's duties
to pronounce and explain the sentence. Third, these statements are about
individuals whose personal stories are often sympathetic accounts of wo-
men drawn into their partners' drug business or addicts who turned to
petty dealing to supply their habits. As importantly, they are rarely the
rapacious, violent kingpins for whom these laws were supposedly passed.
Fourth, unlike Judge Rosenbaum's cases, there is no question that these
judges obeyed the law and imposed the sentence that Congress wants
despite their unhappiness with the result. Thus, these cases are also a
good counter to the recent claims by Attorney General Ashcroft and the
House Republicans that "soft on crime" judges are undermining enforce-
ment of the drug laws. Rather, these transcripts demonstrate that day in
and day out, federal judges follow the law, even when they think it is
wrong and unfair.
Finally, there is the sheer power of the statements themselves. Unlike
the dry legalese of most courtroom proceedings, the anguish and anger of
many judges forced to sentence low-level offenders to disproportionate
terms is often poignant and moving.322 This use of the judicial soapbox,
however, is not without its critics. Some judges and prosecutors believe
that such statements breed a disrespect for the law or constitute a cop out
on the judge's part.32 3 More broadly, some commentators (and a few
321. Some judges address the families of the defendants before imposing a sentence in
an attempt to explain their decision:
Before I impose sentence I just want Mr. Vasquez and any members of his
family who are here to know that I agree with the consensus of almost every-
one that the sentenc[ing] guidelines are horrendous. However, it is driven by
the amount of drugs.... It's sad that a man with no previous record is facing
this sentence. I hope the family realizes that I cannot depart from these
guidelines except under special circumstances [not applicable to this
case] .... Any objection to the sentencing guidelines has to be raised with
the Sentencing Commission and Congress.
Sentencing Tr. at 23, United States v. Alex Vazquez, Cr. 98-086-01 (Oct. 7, 1999, M.D. Pa.)
(statement of District Court Judge Sylvia Rambo).
322. See supra notes 320-21.
323. Interview with two anonymous federal judges (Oct. 15, 2002) (notes on file with
author); Interview with anonymous current federal prosecutor (Jan. 20, 2003) (notes on file
with author).
[Vol. 57
THE WAR WITHIN THE WAR ON CRIME
judges) argue that urging judges to comment on sentencing policy in any
context opens a Pandora's box to judicial lobbying on abortion, school
vouchers, gay marriage, and a host of other contentious social issues.324
The impartiality of the bench would become suspect and respect for the
courts would decline as judges would be viewed as just another stripe of
politician.
While these fears are legitimate, sentencing policy is arguably different.
Judges are the government officials who perform this act and therefore
have the most direct experience of the three branches to determine
whether the current system is fair. Moreover, judicial discretion is close
to the core of judicial independence and the separation of powers princi-
ple. If sentencing were truly reduced to a mathematical calculation with
no human judgment, the judicial branch's long historical role as the pri-
mary actor in sentencing would be over. As the system has begun to
approach that level, the judicial branch has the right of self-defense.
More broadly, critics of judicial speech should also take note that there
is a venerable American tradition of judges voicing their moral distaste
for the results of the laws passed by Congress. Robert Cover's book, Jus-
tice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, is a powerful analysis of
the federal judiciary's reaction to its role in enforcing the Fugitive Slave
Act and other slavery related litigation.325 Cover argues that the rhetoric
of the anti-slavery judges in these cases was "strategically important" and
a critical component of public debate over slavery.326 While not over-
drawing the parallel, there are similarities in the rhetoric of the antebel-
lum judges' struggle between "the demands of role and the voice of
conscience '327 and modern day sentencing transcripts. From this vantage
point, although the majority has spoken through the legislative process,
judges may continue the debate so long as they maintain role fidelity and
enforce the law regardless of how unpleasant it may be for them to do so.
This perspective makes sense if one conceives of policymaking as a
broad and fluid dialogue. Barry Friedman is perhaps the best proponent
of this view. He argues that all federal policy, and not just constitutional
interpretation, is a complex conversation among and between Congress,
the Executive Branch, the courts, state and local government, and the
People. 32 8 This dialogue occurs along a variety of levels of formality and
informality, directness and indirectness. At the most formal level, Con-
gress legislates and the President vetoes or the Court holds legislation
unconstitutional. However, political elites interact in other ways. Judges,
legislators, presidents, and lobbyists have informal meetings and personal
friendships never reported in the Congressional Quarterly. But the
324. See Resnick, supra note 274, at 283-93.
325. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED; ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PRO-
CESS (1975).
326. Id. at 237-38.
327. Id. at 6.




branches also interact in fluid ways that defy easy categorization as for-
mal or informal. For example, when a branch loses in one area, the battle
can continue elsewhere. Specifically, a president may alter the impact of
legislation using the executive's discretionary spending power, to which
Congress might respond by holding oversight hearings. The same process
occurs with regard to the judicial branch. Judges make countless rulings
in court proceedings and trials that can frustrate the intent of Congress or
prosecutorial strategy.329 In this context, the Feeney Amendment repre-
sents a return to the formal stage because the legislative branch (arguably
wrongly) believed its official mandate was being voided.
However, Friedman maintains that an essential part of this dialogue of
democracy in a system of separated powers must include the People. 330
Particularly when two branches encroach upon the third, there must be
redress to the citizenry.331 In this context, the judiciary should rethink its
reticence toward speaking directly to the public. Thus, for those judges
not comfortable speaking with the press or writing letters to Congress
and the Sentencing Commission (or even making comments in their
courtroom), there is still their own backyard. There is no formal bar to a
federal judge accepting invitations from citizens groups such as the Ro-
tary Club, the Elks, or the League of Women Voters. In such venues,
judges could explain what they do and how they see their jobs, in com-
plete conformity with the Judicial Code of Conduct. If even half of the
sitting federal bench committed to just a few of these speaking engage-
ments a year, such an effort would greatly assist in reeducating the public,
which has been badly misled about the nature and practice of the judicial
function during the course of many years of political campaigns.
Moreover, judges, as beleaguered as they feel in the current climate,
should have some hope that the public is willing to listen to them at this
local level. Their ability to influence and persuade, while perhaps not
extending to the halls of Congress, does go beyond the confines of their
courtrooms. While social conservatives may find federal judges a suspect
class, Main Street America is still likely to give some weight to the opin-
ion of a local federal judge who they know of, and who has been part of
their community for many years. Moreover, the robe and judicial office
carry a certain dignity and credibility above that of politicians for most
citizens. Finally, given the long Anglo-American tradition of judicial sen-
tencing discretion, a conversation about their personal struggles to fairly
sentence criminals and how they now lack the ability to do justice in an
individual case is likely to be in accord with the average citizen's under-
standing of what judging is supposed to be about.
329. My personal example was the judge who granted a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal in the case discussed in Part II.A. I later speculated that the judge's decision was influ-
enced by testimony that this defendant had served in the military and received an
honorable discharge more than the facts of the case.
330. Id. at 585.
331. Id.
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With some or all of these efforts, the judiciary could help improve the
public's understanding of the judicial function and set the table for sen-
tencing reform by the political branches. 332 In the end, as with all policy
debates, the pendulum will swing back again-the critical question is
when. Judicial voice can matter. The issue for the judiciary is only
whether more of them will try.
332. Another example of a judicial effort of this sort was the announcement in October,
2003, that the Ninth Circuit will sponsor a task force to study the federal sentencing guide-
lines. Speaking on its prospective goals, Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder stated: "With
luck, we can get a few things fixed in the short run ... but more importantly, for the long
run we can educate Congress and the general public about the importance of rethinking
our whole federal sentencing system." Clair Johnson, New Law Limits Judges' Discretion
for Sentencing, BILLINGS GAZETrE, Oct. 5, 2003, at http://www.billingsgazette.com/in-
dex.php?display=rednews/2003/10/05/build/state/30-sentencing.inc (last visited Jan. 25,
2004).
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